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USE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT FOR
DISCOVERY PURPOSES*
EDWARD A. TOMLINSON**
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) and discovery provide
separate mechanisms for obtaining the disclosure of government docu-
ments. Under the FOIA, any person may obtain any reasonably de-
scribed agency records unless the records fall within one of the nine
exemptions specified in the Act.2 In discovery, on the other hand, a
* The author prepared this article while serving as a consultant to the Administrative
Conference of the United States. The views expressed are those of the author. For the
Conference's action on the consultant's report, see infra note 3.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. Id. at § 552(b). Section 552(b) provides that:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive or-
der to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be with-
held from the public in such manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters
to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) dis-
close the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by
an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confiden-
tial information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforce-
ment personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation
or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person re-
questing such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this
subsection.
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party to litigation may obtain-to the extent permitted by the applica-
ble procedural rules-relevant, unprivileged government documents. A
litigant's access to discovery raises the issue of whether the litigant
should be permitted to use the FOIA for discovery purposes. At present,
the two mechanisms are distinct, and a litigant has the same right of
access under the FOIA as does any other FOIA requester.
This Article analyzes the advantages of FOIA access to litigants
and the disadvantages it poses for the government. Part I identifies vari-
ous uses of the FOIA for discovery purposes. Part II then compares the
discovery available under the FOIA with that available in civil, crimi-
nal, and administrative proceedings. Part III describes in more detail
eight different uses of the FOIA for discovery purposes. Finally, Part IV
analyzes pending legislative proposals to restrict litigants' FOIA access.
The Article concludes that Congress should not amend the FOIA to
deny litigants the same access to agency records that is available to
others, but that Congress should require a party to litigation with the
government to notify government counsel of any discovery motivated
FOIA requests.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Relatznshz Between the FOZA and Discoveoy
Congress's fundamental design when it enacted the FOIA in 1966
was to permit the public to inform itself about the operations of govern-
ment.' Because all members of the public are beneficiaries of the Act, a
3. At its Plenary Session on December 16, 1983, the Administrative Conference did not
take a position on whether the Congress should limit the FOIA rights of litigants. The con-
sultant's report favored the status quo. The Committee on Governmental Processes, whose
report brought the matter to the floor, proposed that the Conference approve the provisions
in S. 774 temporarily closing the FOIA to parties in litigation with the government. For a
discussion of S. 774, see text accompanying notes 357-58. The Recommendation adopted by
the Conference addressed only the notice requirement. It reads as follows:
1. Congress should amend the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to require a
party to a judicial action or to an administrative adjudication or formal rulemaking
proceeding, to which the Government is also a party, to notify counsel for the Gov-
ernment promptly of any FOIA requests made by the party, by his counsel, or by
some other person acting on the party's behalf, during the pendency of the proceed-
ing for the purpose of securing the release of agency records that may be relevant to
the proceeding.,
2. Congress should also provide that, if a party does not comply with this notice
requirement, the court or agency conducting the proceeding may preclude the party
from offering in the proceeding any agency records released in response to the
request.
I C.F.R. § 305.83-4 (1984).
4. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975). When enacting the
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requester's rights are not affected by his litigation generated need for
government records. 5 Discovery, on the other hand, is designed to nar-
row and clarify the issues in litigation and to ascertain the facts, or infor-
mation as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relevant to those
issues.6 In discovery, therefore, the strength of a party's litigation gener-
ated need for documents may result in the production of documents not
available to the public; or, ironically, the weakness of a party's need may
result in the withholding of documents obtainable through the FOIA.
Because Congress designed the FOIA to provide a uniform, minimum
level of access to government records, that access should remain avail-
able even though the FOIA requester also has access to discovery. Dis-
covery should provide a second level of access available only to parties
to litigation. Ideally, a party's access to relevant documents in discovery
should be as great or greater than that available under the FOIA, and it
should not be necessary to use the FOIA for discovery purposes.
Partly because discovery is not primarily a disclosure mechanism,
the actual relationship between the FOIA and discovery is far more
complicated. Although discovery does serve as a disclosure device, its
primary function is to enable parties to litigation to prepare for trial or
to settle a controversy without a trial. It is not designed to provide the
parties with the first level, minimum access to government records that
is available under the FOIA, and even the most generous rules of discov-
ery do not always provide that level of access.
A second factor contributing to the complicated interaction be-
tween the FOIA and discovery is the limited nature of the government's
disclosure obligations in discovery. Full discovery is normally available
only for a short time before trial or hearing and only with respect to
relevant documents. Less generous discovery is available in criminal
proceedings than in civil actions, and in some agency adjudications, no
formal discovery is available at all. Even with respect to civil actions,
reformers, emphasizing that the purpose of discovery is not the disclo-
sure of information but the simplification of issues, have urged the re-
structuring of discovery and other pretrial procedures, not to maximize
the exchange of information, but to require the parties to focus their
presentations in advance of trial.7 The 1980 and 1983 amendments to
FOIA, Congress recognized "the right of the individual to be able to find out how his Govern-
ment is operating." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2423. It also sought to ensure that the "private citizen" would be
afforded "the essential information to enable him to deal effectively and knowledgeably with
the Federal agencies." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965).
5. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 n.23 (1978).
6. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
7. Lundquist, Trial Lawyer or Litigator, 7 LITIGATION, Summer, 1981, at 3. Mr. Lund-
19841
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt the reformers' approach and
seek to prevent "overdiscovery" by increasing the trial judge's supervi-
sory role and reducing a party's access to information.'
Hence, discovery motivated uses of the FOIA are likely to occur
despite the Supreme Court's admonition in NLRB v. Robbins Tire &Rub-
ber Co. ' that the FOIA was "not intended to function as a private discov-
ery tool"' and despite the Court's earlier interpretation of the FOIA in
NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co. " as "fundamentally designed to inform the
public about agency action and not to benefit private litigants."12 A
litigant is a member of the general public and, in that capacity, is enti-
tled under the FOIA to the same access to government records as is any
other person. Thus, in both Sears 3 and Robbins Tire, 4 the Court explic-
itly recognized that although a FOIA requester's status as a party to
litigation did not "enhance" his rights under the FOIA, that status did
not "diminish" them.
B. Descriptotn of Present Study
Theoretical analysis of the relationship between the FOIA and dis-
covery provides a framework for evaluating the various proposals to
close the FOIA to litigants, but it is also necessary to consider the practi-
cal problems created for the government when a litigant has access to
both the FOIA and discovery. To obtain information about the use of
the FOIA for discovery purposes and about the problems that that use
poses for government agencies, the author interviewed FOIA experts in
twenty-eight agencies, at the Department of Justice, and in private prac-
tice.' 5 The information obtained through these interviews was largely
quist was a co-chairman of the American Bar Association's Special Committee for the Study
of Discovery Abuse. The Committee was instrumental in securing the Supreme Court's adop-
tion of the 1980 and 1983 amendments to the civil discovery rules.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 104-14.
9. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
10. Id. at 242.
11. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
12. Id. at 143 n.10.
13. Id.
14. 437 U.S. at 242 n.23.
15. The author and the Administrative Conference staff, on the basis of a preliminary
survey of the case law and secondary literature, compiled an initial list of twenty-four agen-
cies to contact for further information. The agencies constituted a good cross-section of the
federal administrative establishment and included all agencies believed to have had substan-
tial experience with the use of the FOIA for discovery purposes. In late December, 1982, the
Chairman of the Conference wrote the general counsel of each agency on the list asking him
to designate someone in his office knowledgeable on FOIA matters to serve as a contact.
During the winter and spring of 1983, the author interviewed the agency contacts and usually
followed up this initial interview by interviewing at least two or three additional agency offi-
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impressionistic, because the agencies do not generate any hard data
about the use of the FOIA for discovery purposes. An agency cannot
require a FOIA requester to identify the purpose of his request, and the
FOIA requester need not even properly identify himself (zte., he may
employ a straw man or a service company to make the request). The
mere fact that attorneys and regulated interests comprise a significant
portion of an agency's FOIA requesters thus does not reveal much about
the nature of the requests or about the problems the requests present to
the agency. 16
Nevertheless, several facts did emerge from the interviews. First,
the FOIA is no substitute for pretrial discovery when the government is
a party to the procecding and adequate discovery is available. In this
situation, agency and private lawyers agree that discovery is a more reli-
able disclosure mechanism and that a litigant is unlikely to obtain addi-
tional relevant documents through the FOIA. Hence, in litigation to
which the government is a party, the heaviest use of the FOIA occurs
cials recommended to him. The author also expanded the list of agencies to include four
additional agencies which he contacted on his own initiative.
The interviewees in most agencies were lawyers. The initial contact in the majority of
cases was the lawyer in the general counsel's office who handled (normally in an advisory
capacity) appeals from initial denials of FOIA requests. The interviews focused on the
FOIA's impact on the conduct of agency investigations and on the preparation of cases for
trial. For this reason, an effort was made to interview agency litigators who were more likely
to be informed on these matters than public information officers.
The author also interviewed approximately twenty attorneys in the Department of
Justice (primarily in the Civil, Land and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions) and approxi-
mately thirty private practitioners. The Justice Department lawyers were recommended to
him by one of the co-directors of the Office of Information and Privacy in the Department
and by agency attorneys with contacts in the Department. The private practitioners were
contacted because of their known expertise on FOIA or discovery matters or because they
were recommended by agency attorneys as persons to contact to obtain the practitioner's
perspective on the use of the FOIA for discovery purposes. While there was no systematic
basis for the selection of Justice Department attorneys and private practitioners, the author
believes that he interviewed a representative sample of informed respondents. An effort to
contact a larger group of private attorneys through a mailed questionnaire did not receive a
statistically significant response.
The Chairman of the Conference contacted the following agencies: Department of
Agriculture; Deparment of the Air Force; Department of Defense; Department of Energy;
Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment; Department of the Interior; Department of Labor; Department of Transportation; De-
partment of the Treasury; Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); EEOC; FCC;
FERC; Federal Reserve Board; FTC; GSA; INS; IRS; NLRB; NRC; SEC.
The additional agencies contacted by the author were: Department of the Army; De-
partment of the Navy; Department of State; CIA.
16. For statistics on the heavy use of the FOIA at certain agencies (e.g., the FDA, the
SEC, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission) by attorneys and regulated interests,
see Koch & Rubin, A Proposalfor a Comprehensive Restructurnng of the Public Information System,
1979 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 n.54.
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prior to the commencement of the action, when discovery is not yet
available. Parties or potential parties to private litigation also exten-
sively use the FOIA. Many agency lawyers and private practitioners
believe that in private litigation the FOIA is a more efficient mechanism
for obtaining access to agency records than discovery.
A second fact that emerged from these interviews is that the use of
the FOIA for discovery purposes often imposes a significant burden on
government agencies. When the government is not a party to a proceed-
ing, responding to FOIA requests may be no more burdensome than
providing third party discovery-unless, of course, the discovering party
asks the government to do both. The government's burden is more
acute when it is a party because, although the government is normally
able to prevent the release under the FOIA of documents that are privi-
leged in the discovery context, the FOIA process favors disclosure and
requires the government to work harder to protect privileged docu-
ments."7 The FOIA also permits parties to circumvent relevancy, tem-
poral, and other discovery restrictions designed "to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."'" The use of the
FOIA by parties to whom discovery is unavailable is particularly bur-
densome for government agencies.
Yet the interviews did not answer the crucial question of whether
the burden, which primarily involves assigning government personnel,
who might be more profitably engaged in other tasks, to FOIA matters,
is unwarranted. Indeed, the bureaucratic burden is part of the cost of
complying with the Act, for Congress has decided to afford all persons
access to all nonexempt agency records. It is nonetheless disturbing to
learn that in order to comply with the Act, the FBI, at the behest of
federal prisoners, must assign hundreds of professional agents to review,
on a line-by-line basis, closed investigatory files to determine which por-
tions it may safely release.' 9 Parties to litigation, like prisoners, often
make FOIA requests because they have an incentive to do so. But is the
burden of responding to these requests unwarranted when the same
agency would respond in the same fashion to an identical request by a
17. In discovery, the government shares with other parties the attorney-client and work-
product privileges. Among the privileges which are unique with the government are the state
secrets privilege, the informer's privilege, the official information privilege, and the law en-
forcement evidentiary privilege. See Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d
339, 343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
19. 1 Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S 587, S 1235, S 1247, S 1730, and S 1751
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
861-62 (1981) (testimony of William H. Webster, Director, FBI) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
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curious bystander? Perhaps the level of access available to the general
public is too great. If the burden of responding to certain types of FOIA
requests becomes too overwhelming, the proper remedy is not to bar
requesters selectively, but to restrict the access available to everyone. 20
The interviews did disclose that parties make FOIA requests to sup-
plement discovery because they believe they will receive more informa-
tion, or receive it sooner. These advantages of the FOIA are most
apparent when the controversy between the government and a potential
party has not yet ripened into a formal proceeding in which the party
has access to discovery. But parties to litigation may invoke the FOIA
in other contexts and for a variety of reasons. Although the categories
into which this article divides the various uses21 are somewhat imprecise,
categorization assists the analysis of why parties use the FOIA for dis-
covery and how those techniques affect government agencies.
Finally, the interviews disclosed that the various uses of the FOIA
for discovery purposes may overlap other, clearly permissible uses of the
Act. Often, the distinction between informing the public and furthering
one's own interest in litigation is not a sharp one, and FOIA requesters
may have both purposes in mind. For example, a public interest organi-
zation such as the Natural Resources Defense Council may seek agency
records both to inform the public of an environmental hazard and to use
in a proceeding to which the organization is a party (e.g., a licensing
proceeding at the NRC). Likewise, a victim of governmental wrongdo-
20. For example, section 14 of S. 774, as approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in
June, 1983, excludes organized crime files from the entire Act for a period of five years from
the date generated or acquired. Similarly, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, denies all reques-
ters access to a large category of agency records that are primarily of interest to persons in
litigation with the government. Section 552a(d)(5) exempts from the provisions of that Act
"any information compiled in reasonable anticipation of civil action or proceeding." That
exemption affords broader protection to an agency's case files than does the work product
component of FOIA exemption b(5). Smiertka v. Department of the Treasury, 447 F. Supp.
221, 227-28 (D.D.C. 1978). Courts are divided on whether a first party FOIA requester (i.e., a
requester seeking information about himself) may obtain records exempt under the Privacy
Act. See, e.g., Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (FOIA
access available). But see, e.g., Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act an
exemption b(3) statute under the FOIA). In practice, most agencies have followed Greentree.
21. Parties or potential parties to litigation use the FOIA as follows:
A. To obtain evidence or leads for a claim prior to filing suit against the government.
B. To obtain information about a potential governmental proceeding against the requester.
C. To obtain agency generated records for use in private litigation.
D. To obtain privately submitted agency records for use in private litigation.
E. To obtain agency records unavailable in discovery because they are privileged.
F. To obtain irrelevant agency records.
G. To obtain an additional search for relevant agency records.
H. To obtain agency records which are not adequately discoverable because of external
limitations on discovery.
1984]
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ing may use the FOIA both to influence government policy by publiciz-
ing the wrongdoing and to further a tort suit. In these instances, the
FOIA should remain open to litigants even if they are barred from using
the FOIA for discovery purposes.
This article will not address one major use of the FOIA by potential
litigants. Persons subject to agency regulation often use the FOIA to
keep abreast of the agency's operative law and of studies that may lead
to changes. Law firms representing energy companies, for example,
often maintain their own libraries of Department of Energy records.
Congressional testimony or other public utterances by departmental of-
ficials that reveal new factual studies or a possible change in policy in-
variably prompt FOIA requests for agency records on the matter.
Lawyers in many specialized areas of practice similarly use the FOIA to
obtain operational manuals and other internal materials prepared for
the guidance of agency staff. Those records, which contain much of an
agency's operative law and procedure, are very useful in dealing with an
agency on a day-to-day basis even if the practitioner has no particular
litigation in mind. If litigation does arise, he will have a head start in
preparing for trial.
Use of the FOIA to gather information about an agency's internal
operations is consistent with the Act's purpose of furthering open gov-
ernment because it permits regulated interests to deal more intelligently
with the agency. The FOIA is thus immensely useful to the private
practitioner who must advise a client whether a course of conduct is
legal and prudent or who must appear informally before an agency on
behalf of a client. As will be seen, the FOIA is less useful as a discovery
device.2 2 Although a party may avoid the time, scope, and other limita-
tions on discovery requests, the FOIA only affords a party the first level
access to agency records that is available to the general public. To pre-
pare adequately for a trial or hearing, a party must participate in the
exchange of information and the narrowing of issues which are the
hallmarks of discovery.
C Summay of Conclusions
The use of the FOIA for discovery purposes takes many forms. As
will be seen, some discovery uses are plainly appropriate (e.g., the preliti-
gation use of the FOIA to discover the factual basis for a lawsuit), while
others are more questionable (e.g., a party's use of the FOIA to require
an agency to conduct additional or duplicative searches). In addition to
the burdens imposed by discovery motivated FOIA requests, the avail-
22. See infra Part III.
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ability of the FOIA as a discovery tool may also disadvantage the gov-
ernment in litigation. Despite the problems associated with the use of
the FOIA for discovery purposes, it is neither fair nor workable to deny
a litigant access to records available to anyone else. Discrimination
based on a requester's status is inconsistent with the FOIA's basic goal of
providing all members of the public with first level access to information
about the operations of government.
The argument for treating persons using the FOIA for discovery
purposes differently than nondiscovery motivated requesters is premised
upon the belief that litigants do not need the FOIA because they have,
or will have, access to discovery. Why then, the argument goes, should
parties or potential parties to litigation be permitted to burden the gov-
ernment with FOIA requests that may delay the government's response
to other FOIA requests or disrupt the government's trial preparation?
This rationale for closing the FOIA to litigants is not convincing. A
party to litigation "needs" the FOIA because discovery is not designed
to afford, and often does not afford, the first level access to government
documents available to any person under the FOIA. When the govern-
ment makes an inadequate discovery search, raises a claim of privilege,
obtains a protective order, or contends that the documents sought are
irrelevant, a party needs the FOIA at least as much as anyone else does.
While in theory a discovering party should obtain all the government
documents necessary to prepare for trial or hearing, functional consider-
ations (e., the goal of resolving controversies in a timely fashion) may
influence a discovery system or court to interpret narrowly a party's dis-
covery needs. In these situations, a requester's status as a party should
not reduce his rights under the FOIA.2 3 Although a party's FOIA re-
quests may be burdensome, it is both unfair and unenforceable for an
agency to deny a party the first level access which it affords to other
FOIA requesters whose interest in obtaining the records almost surely
will be less than that of the party. 4
23. It seems particularly unjustified to deprive a defendant of his statutory right of access
to government records merely because the government has initiated a proceeding against
him.
24. A FOIA requester's status as a party to litigation likewise should not enlarge his access
to agency records. Even under exemptions b(6) and b(7)(C), where the agency must balance
the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests which would be invaded by
disclosure, it is the public's interest in disclosure that is dispositive. Washington Post Co. v.
Department of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The party
requester also should not receive any preferential treatment in the processing of his request.
Courts have held that a requester's need for records in collateral litigation does not constitute
a "genuine need and reason for urgency" permitting him to gain access to government
records ahead of prior FOIA requesters. Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
547 F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Mitsubishi Elec. Co. v. Department of Justice, 39 Ad. L.
19841
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The use of the FOIA for discovery purposes is nevertheless a matter
of valid concern because that use, unlike others, may disadvantage the
government's position in litigation. First, a party in litigation with the
government may obtain agency records without the knowledge of gov-
ernment counsel and then use those records to surprise him at trial or
hearing. Second, the party may disrupt the government's preparation
by seeking, perhaps on the eve of the trial or hearing, the release of
records in the government's litigation files. The government then must
divert its attention from trial preparation in order to prevent a FOIA
release to an opposing party of sensitive, nondisclosable records. Under
the FOIA, unlike in discovery, the government does not enjoy the pro-
tection of a cut-off date for the making of requests or of a neutral judge
to resolve disputes. Third, a party may request the government to pro-
duce the same documents under the FOIA and in discovery, thus neces-
sitating duplicative searches and releases. In these cases, the
government's primary concern is not the extra burden imposed on the
agency's public information office in processing the FOIA request-that
is part of the cost of having a Freedom of Information Act-but the
burden imposed on government counsel who must prevent inadvertent
FOIA releases and remain informed of government documents obtained
by opposing parties.
The disadvantages to the government are substantial, but they do
not accompany most uses of the FOIA for discovery purposes. Parties in
litigation with the government use the FOIA for discovery purposes be-
cause they expect to obtain the release of agency records not obtainable
in discovery, or only obtainable in a less convenient fashion or at a later
time. They seldom use the FOIA to surprise government counsel, to
disrupt counsel's trial preparation, or to require the government to con-
duct duplicative searches. Abusive FOIA requests occur most fre-
quently prior to the commencement of criminal and administrative
enforcement proceedings by the persons under investigation. Thus, pro-
posals to close the FOIA to parties topending proceedings would provide
agencies with limited relief.
On the other hand, the government will receive some protection
from the abuses which occur if a party in litigation with the government
must notify government counsel of all discovery motivated FOIA re-
Rep. 2d 1133 (D.D.C. 1976); Gonzalez v. DEA, 2 Gov'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 81,016
(D.D.C. 1980); Rivera v. DEA, 2 Gov'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 81,365 (D.D.C. 1981); Green-
tree v. DEA, 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 1 80,201 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 674
F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982). However, one court ordered expedited processing of a FOIA re-
quest filed by a criminal defendant in a state capital prosecution. See Cleaver v. Kelley, 427
F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1976).
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quests. A "discovery motivated" FOIA request is a request made by a
party, his counsel, or some person acting on his behalf, for the purpose
of obtaining information for use in pending litigation with the govern-
ment. If counsel representing the government receives notice of these
FOIA requests, he will be able to determine what records the agency
plans to release and thus eliminate any danger of surprise at trial or
hearing. Further, government counsel will be able to coordinate FOIA
and discovery searches and to avoid duplicative releases. Although he
still may need to divert his attention from trial preparation to assist the
agency's public information office in resisting the disclosure of exempt
records, advance notice of FOIA requests should enhance counsel's abil-
ity to protect litigation files. Because such notice would afford the gov-
ernment considerable relief from abuse of the FOIA, Congress should
amend the FOIA to require notice and reject proposals to close the
FOIA to litigants.2 5
II. DOCUMENT DISCOVERY UNDER THE FOIA AND THE RULES OF
DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON
It is necessary to consider how the FOIA and discovery systems
function to understand why agencies object to some uses of the FOIA for
discovery purposes and why litigants continue to use the FOIA despite
the fact that discovery is ordinarily the more reliable way to obtain doc-
uments for use in litigation. The FOIA offers litigants an invariable
level of discovery unaffected by differences in the discovery rules appli-
cable to civil, criminal, and agency proceedings. Even under a single set
of rules, discovery varies according to the subject matter of the proceed-
ing. For example, the civil rules permit more discovery in tort suits
against state or federal officials for constitutional violations,2 6 or in anti-
trust suits brought by the government,2 7 than in nonstatutory review
proceedings, in which the court limits its review to the agency record.28
From the government's perspective, the FOIA is open to all the
abuses of discovery without supplying any of discovery's concomitant
advantages. Parties can make massive demands for irrelevant docu-
ments, deliberately request nondisclosable documents, and file multiple
requests for the same information. In discovery, such unreasonable re-
quests are tempered by a mutuality of interest in exchanging informa-
tion and by the presence of a neutral umpire. In the FOIA process, on
25. For further discussion of the notice proposal, see in/a Part IV(c).
26. See Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
27. Set United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 43 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. See McMillan & Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional
Factflding DuringJudwial Review of Informal Agency Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333, 333-34.
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the other hand, only one side receives any disclosure, and there is no
satisfactory mechanism for limiting unreasonable requests. Not only are
discovery motivated FOIA requests less useful in resolving lawsuits, but
they place a greater burden on the government than do similar discov-
ery requests. For even though agency records that are privileged in dis-
covery almost always are exempt under the FOIA, the agency usually
must work harder under the FOIA to protect the same documents. In
particular, the FOIA gives an agency less time to respond to requests
and requires it to provide a more detailed justification for withholding a
document.
A. The Release of Agency Records Under the FOA
The Act makes it very easy to make a FOIA request. The requester
need only "reasonably describe" the records he wants and comply with
the agency's published rules on the "time, place, fees (if any), and proce-
dures to be followed.""9 The burdens placed on the agency are much
greater. It must decide within ten working days3" whether to comply
with the request, determine any appeal from an initial denial within
twenty working days after receipt of the appeal,3 1 and notify the re-
quester of the reasons for its determination.3 2  Upon notice to a re-
quester, an agency may extend the time limits for only ten working days
in "unusual circumstances. '33 If an agency fails to meet the time lim-
its,3 ' or withholds a requested record by claiming an exemption, the
requester may file suit to compel disclosure.3 5 Within thirty days of
service, the agency must serve an answer or otherwise plead to the com-
plaint.3 6 The court then must expedite the case in every way3 7 and de-
termine de novo whether the agency improperly withheld any records.3 8
In court the agency has the burden of sustaining its action in with-
holding records. 9 To avoid summary judgment the agency must either
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1982).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982).
33. Agencies may take extra time to search distant offices for records, to examine a volu-
minous amount of records, or to consult other agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(B)(i)-(iii) (1982).
34. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1982).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) permits requesters to sue in the district court in the
district in which the requester resides or has his place of business, in which the records are
kept, or in the District of Columbia.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C) (1982).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1982).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
39. Id.
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produce the records or establish that they are nonexistent or exempt. 4°
An agency must file detailed affidavits to justify exemption claims. The
requester, who has not seen the records and thus has little basis for chal-
lenging the affidavits, normally moves the court to order the agency to
file a Vaughn index,4 1 which contains in affidavit form a detailed
itemization of the withheld records (often on a paragraph-by-paragraph
or line-by-line basis). The agency must cross-reference each item to the
statutory bases for the withholding and to the justifications advanced in
the agency's other affidavits. Courts require a detailed breakdown of
the withheld records because the agency must establish, not only that
each record contains exempt matter, but that none contain any reason-
ably segregable, nonexempt matter.4 2
The Vaughn index serves a twofold purpose: first, it permits a re-
quester to argue intelligently for the nonexempt status of a document;
and second, it permits the court to avoid conducting an in camera pro-
ceeding.4 3 Although the district court has statutory authority to ex-
amine agency records in camera,4 4 case law strongly disfavors such
inspections because they are burdensome and lack the benefit of an ad-
versary presentation.4 5
The lack of in camera review imposes a significant burden of justifi-
cation on the government.4 6 Although the courts of appeals have em-
phasized that the district courts must be flexible in allowing the
government to protect the confidentiality of its records (e.g., by making
some of its showing in camera or by submitting a randomly selected
sample of the documents for in camera inspection), 47 district courts nor-
mally order the government to submit a detailed Vaughn index.4 8 Too
40. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. The term is derived from the first case in which a court ordered the government to
prepare such an index, Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 415 U.S.
977 (1974).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) requires the release of reasonably segregable nonexempt por-
tions of otherwise exempt records.
43. See Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1983); Vaughn, 484
F.2d at 824-25.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
45. See, e.g., Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Mead Data Central,
Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 250 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ingle, 698 F.2d
at 264-65; Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 530-31 (11th Cir. 1983).
46. This burden is particularly onerous in cases involving the withholding of information
for national security reasons. See, e.g., Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir.
1981); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Terkel v. Kelly, 599
F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Stein, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254; Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (5th
Cir. 1980); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, at 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
48. Ironically, requesters also are unhappy with the FOIA's "awkward" mechanism for
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often the FOIA court focuses not on the question of whether the records
themselves are exempt, but on whether the agency's stated justification
for withholding them is adequate. This situation is made tolerable only
by the deference49 accorded agency determinations on such questions as
whether a record is properly classified (exemption b(l)),5 ° whether the
release of an investigatory record would interfere with law enforcement
proceedings (exemption b(7)(A)),5 1 or whether the release of an investi-
gatory record would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy (exemption b(7)(C)). 52
The disclosure process is quite different in discovery despite the oc-
casional use of some FOIA procedures to resolve discovery disputes. Ex-
cept with respect to claims of privilege for state secrets, in camera review
of withheld documents is the norm.53 Until recently, most attorneys re-
lied upon the judgment and good faith of counsel asserting a privilege;
today, opposing counsel is more likely to press for a judicial determina-
tion.54 Counsel commonly asks for a list of all responsive documents
that a party has withheld on the basis of privilege. The list typically
identifies each document by author, recipient, date, and subject matter
and states the basis for the claim of privilege.5 5 Courts have even used
the term Vaughn index to describe these lists when prepared by the gov-
ernment.56 Private practitioners complain, especially with respect to
documents covered by the attorney-client privilege, that the lists disclose
information (e.g., the subject matter of the document) which the privi-
lege ought to protect. 57
review of agency withholdings. See, e.g., Sten, 662 F.2d at 1252. Requesters who, like the
courts, have had no opportunity to review the withheld records are concerned by the courts'
ready acceptance of agency justifications. See Lively, Catch 7(,4). The Plaintfs Burden Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 28 VILL. L. REv. 75 (1982-83).
49. The Stein court, for example, described its role as one of "judicial review," apparently
ignoring the de novo review requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). 662 F.2d at 1252.
50. See, e.g., Military Audit Project, 656 F.2d at 738; Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
51. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239 (1978).
52. See Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978).
53. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 427, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(deliberative process privilege); United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 608 (D.D.C. 1979)
(Special Masters' Guidelines for the Resolution of Privilege Claims); United States v. Pfizer,
Inc., 560 F.2d 326, 336 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977) (work product privilege); Black v. Sheraton Corp.
of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (law enforcement evidentiary privilege).
54. See DavidsonJud'cialProcedures for Resolving Clains of Prvilege, 8 LITIGATION, Summer,
1982, at 36.
55. Id. at 37.
56. See, e.g., Black, 564 F.2d at 544-45. The court nevertheless held that the government
was entitled to an in camera inspection of the documents before it could be ordered to pro-
duce them. Id. at 545.
57. Davidson, supra note 54, at 36.
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The availability of in camera review, however, substantially lessens
the government's burden of justifying the withholding of a document
and shifts to the court much of the burden of reviewing withheld docu-
ments. In the "Agent Orange" litigation, for example, Judge Pratt re-
quired the government to submit an affidavit describing in general
terms any documents claimed to be privileged, why a privilege applied,
and the harm which would result from disclosure.5" He also required
the government to make the documents available for in camera inspec-
tion. The court explicitly recognized that automatic in camera inspec-
tion lessens the government's burden because its affidavits can then be
less detailed.59 The court can better manage the burden of review in
discovery because the judge or master is more likely to be familiar with
the subject matter of the documents. In addition, the discovery court
has a greater need to assume the burden because, unlike a FOIA court,
it often must determine whether a party's need for a document out-
weighs the government's interest in confidentiality. In camera review
thus benefits both the government 6° and the discovery court and makes
it procedurally easier to withhold documents in discovery than under
the FOIA.
Another factor facilitating the release of agency records is the high-
ly decentralized nature of most agency FOIA operations. To permit the
more efficient release of agency records, agency regulations normally re-
quire that a FOIA requester submit her request to the office where the
requested records are located-in most cases a regional or local office.61
Public information officers in these offices, despite their lack of legal
training, may release nonexempt records. On the other hand, the denial
of a request is a legal matter which requires the advice of an attorney.
The Department of the Air Force, for example, authorizes hundreds of
public information officers around the world to grant FOIA requests but
permits only thirty-two persons, acting on the advice of counsel, to deny
them. Of course, if an agency knows that a particular custodian is re-
sponsible for a considerable number of records likely to contain exempt
matter, such as proprietary information (exemption b(4)) or classified
information (exemption b(l)), the agency may institute tighter controls
over the release decision.
58. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. at 429-30.
59. Id. at 430.
60. Government attorneys do not always view in camera proceedings in such rosy terms.
They often prefer to describe sensitive documents for a judge rather than to permit the judge
to read the documents himself because they fear that a judge who reviews the documents
personally may too readily conclude that there is no harm in disclosing them.
61. Requests to an agency's national or Washington office form a very small portion of
most agencies' FOIA workload.
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Predictably, agencies employ a standard routine for processing
FOIA requests. Upon the receipt of a FOIA request, the agency's public
information office searches for the responsive records and then reviews
them to determine whether they are exempt. (The paper flow is stagger-
ing; the Act could not have been implemented prior to the advent of
photocopying machines.) If the records appear to be connected with
litigation, the public information officer normally contacts the lawyers
representing the agency in the matter. Although the agency's litigators
rarely have authority to deny FOIA requests,6 2 agencies accord great
weight to their views on what records are exempt.
Government litigators fear that a release of exempt records will oc-
cur through inadvertence, inability to comply with the statutory time
limits, or failure to present to the reviewing court an adequate justifica-
tion for withholding. The latter two fears are largely unjustified because
the courts have been excessively indulgent with agencies that miss statu-
tory time limits6 3 or that fail initially to justify the withholding of ex-
empt records.' Individual district court judges sometimes are not so
patient; but there is little evidence that agencies have been forced to
release exempt records because of an inadequate opportunity to justify
withholding them.6 5 Government lawyers mostly complain about the
double burden of protecting sensitive litigation files from discovery and
FOIA requests and about FOIA releases made without consulting them.
In addition to the disadvantages of the intricate system for respond-
ing to FOIA requests, the lack of any reasonableness or relevancy limita-
tions on FOIA requests burdens the government. In discovery, a judge
or umpire is available to protect the government from unreasonably
burdensome requests, and the rules limit discovery to relevant docu-
ments. Under the FOIA, however, the requester need only "reasonably
describe" the records he wants.
Despite the lack of any clearly drawn limits, the courts have inter-
62. Among the agencies contacted, only the FTC authorizes agency litigators to deny
FOIA requests. At the Commission, the Bureau Director or regional office responsible for an
investigation may deny access to an open investigatory file. 16 C.F.R. § 4.1 1(a)(1)(iv)(B)
(1983). Appeals from these initial denials are to the General Counsel.
63. See, e.g., Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (large volume of requests an "exceptional circumstance" under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(C)(1982) for allowing an agency additional time to respond). To avoid the statu-
tory time limits, the agency need only show that it is processing a backlog of requests with due
diligence on a first-in, first-out basis. Id. at 616.
64. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3rd Cir.
1981) (agency granted a second chance to prepare an adequate Vaughn index).
65. However, in the CoastalStates litigation, the Department of Energy did release a sub-
stantial number of records under the district court's order before the court of appeals reversed
and gave the agency more time to establish the exempt status of the records. See id
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preted this "reasonable description" requirement to provide some pro-
tection to agencies. The requester's description of the record must
enable "a professional employee of the agency who [is] familiar with the
subject area of the request to locate the record with a reasonable
amount of effort." 6 6 If the description coincides with a category of doc-
uments previously identified by the agency, it must search for the docu-
ments through its established indexing and retrieval systems.6 7 But if
the agency has not segregated its records in accordance with the descrip-
tion, it need only make a reasonable search; it is not required to reorgan-
ize its filing system in response to a FOIA request." For example, an
agency need not conduct a page-by-page search of its files to uncover
records that served as preparatory documents for congressional testi-
mony 69 or that support a particular proposition (e.g., the safety of a
product) .7
Courts also have held that an agency may limit its search to the
office where the requester submitted the FOIA request and that an
agency need not search its files nationwide simply because a requester
chose to file with the national office. 7 Nothing prevents a requester,
however, from filing multiple requests at different offices or from speci-
fying that he wants a nationwide search. While an agency may refuse to
conduct a burdensome FOIA search if it is highly unlikely to produce
any responsive documents, 72 it may not decline a search on the grounds
that it is likely to produce an unreasonably large number of responsive
documents. In the latter situation, the agency can do no more than tell
the requester that the search may take time and be costly. If the re-
quester is seeking the records primarily for use in litigation (a quintes-
sentially "private" purpose), the agency normally may charge its search
66. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 353 n.88 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1981).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 369-70 (opinion on rehearing); see also National Cable Television Ass'n. v. FCC,
479 F.2d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The National Cable opinion interpreted the pre-1974 re-
quirement that the requester "reasonably identify" the records it wished the agency to release.
Goland followed National Cable in interpreting the "reasonably describe" requirement found in
the present Act. Goland, 607 F.2d at 353 n.88 (initial panel opinion).
69. See Goland, 607 F.2d at 353.
70. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum).
71. See, e.g., Marks v. Department of Justice, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978); Clinch-
field Coal Corp. v. Donovan, 3 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 82,251 (D.D.C. 1982).
72. See Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (search
of FBI's Dallas office would be "fruitless and unreasonable"); Shaw v. NSA, 3 GOV'T DISCLO-
SURE SERV. 83,196 (D.D.C. 1983). Weisberg reaffirms earlier decisions that a FOIA search
must be reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive documents. See, e.g., Perry v. Block,
684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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and duplication costs.73 Most litigant requesters do not have unlimited
time or money and are therefore willing to narrow their requests, but
such negotiations provide less protection for the agency than would a
neutral judge, especially if the litigant has substantial financial
resources.
B. Production of Documents Under Rule 34
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitate document discovery
between parties to litigation and protect the parties (including the gov-
ernment when it enjoys party status) from unreasonable discovery re-
quests. Rule 34 permits a party to request any other party to produce
for inspection and copying any designated, relevant, and unprivileged
documents.74 The request may be served upon the plaintiff after the
commencement of the action, and upon any other party with or after
service of the summons and complaint.7 5 The request must specify a
reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection.76 Rule 34 thus
leaves the timing of document production to the parties, subject to court
supervision. The rule only requires a party to respond within 30 days
after service of the request (or, in the case of a defendant, within 45 days
after service of the summons and complaint) by indicating whether he
will comply or object.77 Of course, if a party objects to a request, or fails
to respond or to permit inspection, the discovering party may move for a
Rule 37(a) order to compel production. 8
Under Rule 34, the discovering party must describe the documents
(by item or category) with "reasonable particularity."7 The designa-
tion requirement permits a party to obtain a more thorough search and
more useful information than under the FOIA. The description need
only be "sufficient to apprise a man of ordinary intelligence what docu-
ments are required" and to permit the court "to ascertain whether the
requested documents have been produced."8 ° Thus, the requester may
73. Dorta v. FBI, 3 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 82,349 (D.D.C. 1982). 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4) (A)(1982) authorizes the agency to waive or reduce its customary charges for docu-
ment search and duplication if the agency determines that furnishing the information can be
considered as "primarily benefiting the general public." The agency's denial of a fee waiver
request is reviewable for arbitrariness and capriciousness. Eudey v. CIA, 478 F. Supp. 1175,
1176 (D.D.C. 1979).
74. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a).
75. Id at 34(b).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2211, at
n.86 (1970)(citing cases).
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assume that the responding party has a "brain" and that, once put on
notice of the documents requested, he will find them even if his indexing
or retrieval system does not coincide with the requester's categorization.
A court may limit, however, a discovery search to those files that poten-
tially contain enough relevant information to warrant searching them. 8 '
The designation requirement of Rule 34 favors the discovering
party in other ways. It permits a party to request all documents rele-
vant to an incident or product, or all the documents an opponent will
use to establish a proposition. These discovery requests 2 are useful in
limiting an opposing party's proof at trial or hearing. They are also
likely to generate more intensive searches than would a FOIA request,
because an agency may not limit a discovery search to its established
indexing and retrieval systems. Documents produced in discovery are
then admissible at trial without additional authentication. The avail-
ability of interrogatories and depositions also makes it easier to obtain
further discovery on the existence of relevant documents. Although a
FOIA requester may, by suing to enjoin the withholding of records, ob-
tain discovery on the sufficiency of a FOIA search, the district court is
likely to grant summary judgment to the government on this issue if the
agency affidavits describing its search are detailed, nonconclusory, and
in good faith. s3
Rule 34 has other advantages for the discovering party. First, dis-
covery is normally free,84 while FOIA requesters seeking records for liti-
gation purposes rarely obtain fee waivers. Second, a party may obtain
litigation related sanctions if an agency fails to provide discovery or-
dered by the court" or even if it successfully invokes a claim of privi-
lege.86 The sanctions available under the FOIA (e.g., the disciplining of
agency employees who arbitrarily withhold records") are not as useful
81. See United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 634 (D.D.C. 1980).
82. Such commonplace discovery requests are not proper FOIA requests. For a discus-
sion of the FOIA requirement that the requester must "reasonably describe" the requested
records, see supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
83. See, e.g., Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Goland v.
CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 445 U.S. 927 (1981); Founding Church of
Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
84. A basic premise underlying the liberal discovery provisions of the federal civil rules is
that the burden of complying with discovery requests is an incident of litigation. Each party
therefore bears his own search and production costs. Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Dis-
covery b the '80's-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 248 (1982).
85. See, e.g., In re Att'y Gen. of the United States, 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1979).
86. If the government chooses to withhold relevant but privileged information, a court
may impose litigation related sanctions. See, e.g., Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923,
940 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding of liability in tort suit against United States); United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (dismissal of indictment).
87. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(F) (1982).
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to parties in litigation. Third, a party who prevails in litigation with the
government may recover attorney's fees attributable to the govern-
ment's failure, without substantial justification, to provide discovery
that was ordered by the court or requested by the party."8 A victorious
complainant in a FOIA suit who sought records for discovery purposes
rarely obtains attorney's fees because his entitlement to an award de-
pends upon a balancing of four factors, one of which is the public bene-
fit (as opposed to a litigation or other private benefit) that results from
the release of the records.89 Finally, a party may obtain relevant docu-
ments under Rule 34 that are exempt under the FOIA. An agency can-
not base a claim of privilege on a FOIA exemption,' even though a
court may consider the congressional policies underlying the FOIA ex-
emption when considering the claim of privilege.9 1 Thus, exempt docu-
88. Section 204(b) of the Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
481, § 204(b), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat.) 2321, 2328, provides that the
United States shall be liable for costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party in any civil action to the extent that any other party would be liable under the common
law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1982) for the codification of this provision, which is part of what is com-
monly referred to as the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Department of Justice apparently
concedes that Rule 37 is a qualifying statute but insists that a private party may recover
attorney's fees for discovery matters only if he is entitled to them under Rule 37 and if he
prevails in the underlying litigation. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
AWARD OF ArrORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 29, 57 (undated). The Supreme Court similarly inter-
preted the prevailing party requirement of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
89. The four factors that the FOIA court must weigh in determining a prevailing com-
plainant's entitlement to attorney's fees under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) are: 1) the
public benefit derived from the release; 2) the commercial benefit to the requester; 3) the
nature of the requester's interest in the records sought; and 4) whether the government's
withholding had a reasonable basis in law. S. REP. No. 854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
These factors are not exhaustive, but the court must consider them. Eg., Church of
Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1983); Cox v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In denying awards courts have reasoned that
complainants who are using the FOIA for discovery purposes already have sufficient incen-
tives for pursuing their judicial remedies under the FOIA. See, e.g., Guam Contractors Ass'n
v. Department of Labor, 3 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 83,174 (N.D. Calif. 1983). In rare
cases, the public interest in the disclosure of the records, or the lack of any reasonable basis to
support the government's withholding, may result in an award of attorney's fees even though
the complainant seeks the records for discovery purposes. See, e.g., Cazalas v. Department of
Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) (employment records sought by potential title VII
plaintiff).
90. See Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Canal Auth. v. Froehlke, 81 F.R.D. 609, 612 (M.D. Fla. 1979), noted in Note, Canal
Authority of Florida v. Froehlke: The Freedom of Information Act Exemptions Provide No Bar to
Discovey, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 435,passim (1980); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 12 n.41
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 97, 99 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
91. See Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions.- The Freedom of Information Act and the
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ments may be discoverable under Rule 34 either because the discovery
privilege is narrower than the corresponding FOIA exemption 92 or be-
cause, as is more likely, the party's need for the document overrides the
government's privilege.
The qualified scope of the privileges available to the government-
the official information, the informer's, and the law enforcement eviden-
tiary privileges-permit a party, upon a showing of need, to obtain
more relevant documents in discovery than under the FOIA.93 The offi-
cial information privilege provides the clearest case. In enacting exemp-
tion 5, Congress intended to afford FOIA requesters the same access to
deliberative material and work product as was routinely available in
discovery. 94 Discovery courts nevertheless have allowed parties, upon a
showing of litigation need, to obtain agency records containing delibera-
tive matter previously found to be exempt under the FOIA.95 A show-
ing of a case-specific need therefore can entitle a party to greater access
to agency records than that "routinely" available to parties in litigation
with the agency, and thus also greater than that available to the public
under the FOIA.96
The scope of the law enforcement evidentiary privilege is less cer-
tain. Courts have interpreted the privilege to cover all investigatory files
Federal Dicovery Rules, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 852 (1981) (citing cases holding that a
court may consider the legislative intent underlying the FOIA exemption).
92. In CanalAuthority, for example, the court held that confidential business information
in an appendix to an agency's environmental impact statement (presumably covered by
FOIA exemption b(4)) was not privileged in discovery in the absence of some statutory basis
for the claim of privilege. It also held that the court ordered disclosure did not violate the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), because the disclosure was authorized by law
(ie., by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)). Canal Authority, 81 F.R.D. at 611. The court did express
willingness to enter a protective order upon an appropriate showing. Id.
93. See Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(providing a general discussion of these qualified privileges).
The state secrets privilege is an exception because it is absolute. A party's need for
discovery affects only the court's scrutiny of the government's claim of a state secrets privilege;
the more a party does to establish his need for the information, the more closely a court must
scrutinize the government's claim of privilege. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11
(1953); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148-49 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 85-86 (1973). Given the ambiguity of the reference in H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428 to "routinely discovera-
ble" (under which discovery rules?), courts interpret exemption 5 to cover only deliberative
material produced in the process of making agency decisions-not factual material or agency
law. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 405 (2d ed. 1978).
95. E.g., United States v. Exxon Corp., 4 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) $ 26,350 (D.D.C. 1982)
(discovery court applied FOIA standards to determine what documents were exempt and
thus privileged from disclosure absent some showing of need).
96. McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1287 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (uniquely relevant
internal report may be discoverable although exempt from release under the FOIA).
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(other than those containing information on governmental wrongdoing)
the release of which might impede law enforcement." If this interpreta-
tion is accurate, the privilege is broader than the corresponding FOIA
exemption b(7), which only protects investigatory records when disclo-
sure would cause one of six specific harms.9 " And it would seem that
fewer documents would be available in discovery. But, as a practical
matter, a party's access to investigatory files in discovery is at least as
great as that of a FOIA requester. Parties primarily seek discovery of
agency investigatory files in tort suits which involve claims of wrongdo-
ing or closed files whose release would not impede law enforcement.
Furthermore, while parties in both tort99 and judicial enforcement ac-
tions"°0 have only limited access in civil discovery to open investigatory
files, a FOIA requester's access is no greater because exemption b(7)(A)
generally precludes access to investigatory records in pending proceed-
ings until those records would be available through discovery.01
A party seeking documents that contain the names of confidential
sources is also more likely to obtain the document through discovery
than by using the FOIA. FOIA exemption b(7)(D) affords absolute pro-
tection to records that would disclose a confidential source if released,
while the informer's privilege affords only qualified protection.10 2 Fur-
ther, upon a showing of need, tort plaintiffs may obtain investigatory
reports without the redactions that would be made to protect the per-
sonal privacy of informants, witnesses, or law enforcement officers when
an agency releases the same documents under the FOIA (exemption
b (7) (C)), t ° 3
97. See, e.g., Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 545-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (closed
investigatory files may be privileged if disclosure would tend to reveal law enforcement tech-
niques or sources); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963) (investigative report privileged if disclosure would hamper efficient operation of im-
portant government program).
98. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A)-(F) (1982).
99. E.g., Swanner v. United States, 406 F.2d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1969) (no abuse of discre-
tion for trial court to deny tort plaintiff access to open investigatory file). But of Brown v.
Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1216-1217 (5th Cir. 1970) (dismissing a tort plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice for lack of proof may be an abuse of discretion if a privileged active file even-
tually may become discoverable).
100. The government must provide discovery of the evidence it anticipates using at trial,
but the remainder of the open file, with the exception of exculpatory andJencks material, may
constitute privileged work product. See J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223,
234 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
101. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232 (1978).
102. See In re United States, 565 F.2d 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962
(1978) (tort suit); Wirtz v. Continental Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1964)
(enforcement proceeding).
103. See Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Note, Discovey of
Government Documents and the Ofcial Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 157-62
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Many government lawyers fear that allowing the use of the FOIA
for discovery purposes will undermine many of the protections that dis-
covery provides. A party's access to government documents under Rule
34, although quite broad, is subject to several constraints. A request
must be timely and the documents must be relevant to the litigation; in
addition, the Supreme Court has amended the civil rules to impose fur-
ther limitations to prevent discovery abuse. Discovery abuses fall into
two categories, °4 both largely attributable to excessive adversariness by
attorneys.0 5 First, parties engage in discovery avoidance through delay,
obfuscation, and other strategems. Judges are reluctant to impose sanc-
tions even for direct violations of the discovery rules because they do not
want to become involved and do not want to punish the client for the
faults of the attorney. 0 6 Second, parties zealously overuse discovery,
although there is considerable controversy over whether this problem is
pervasive or limited to "big" cases.'0 7 Seeking to win a case through
discovery, lawyers sometimes make redundant or excessive requests.' 08
A variant of these abuses occurs when a responding party "dumps" a
huge mass of disorganized documents on the requester.0 9 The
amended discovery rules respond to these abuses by increasing judicial
control over discovery, and thus abandoning the prior philosophy that
the rules should be "designed to encourage extrajudicial discovery with
a minimum of judicial intervention."'' 0
The new discovery rules build upon the experience acquired by
judges trying cases under local rules of court"' and under the case man-
agement approach recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigalion. i '
Rule 26(f), added in 1980, authorizes the trial court to hold a discovery
conference to identify issues and to establish plans, schedules, and limi-
(1976). For a FOIA case describing the redactions permissible under the FOIA but not in
discovery, see Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1001-06 (4th Cir. 1978).
104. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 84, at 246.
105. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery. A Critique and Proposals for Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
106. See Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions. Ajudcial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 273-74
(1979).
107. See Friedenthal, A DividedSupreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 812-13 (1981).
108. See Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 LITIGATION, Spring, 1981, at 8.
109. See Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, 7 LITIGATION, Spring, 1981, at 28.
110. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments to the Discovery
Rules, 48 F.R.D. 485, 488 (1970).
111. See Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager. The New Role in Guiding a Casefirom
Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981).
112. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.10 (1981) (supplement to C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1982)).
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tations applicable to discovery. The rule only requires the court to hold
a conference if an attorney shows that he has made reasonable efforts to
agree on these matters with opposing counsel. The draftsmen of Rule
26(f) thus did not contemplate that discovery conferences would become
routine."l 3 But in 1983, the Court amended Rule 16"' to require the
trial court to enter a scheduling order (containing time limits for the
completion of discovery) within 90 days of the filing of a complaint in
all actions not exempted by a district court rule." l5 The amendment's
elaborate provisions for pretrial conferences and orders further en-
courage judicial control. 1 6
The 1983 amendments to Rule 26 also augment judicial control by
requiring the trial court to limit discovery if it is "unreasonably cumula-
tive or duplicative" or is "unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on
the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake."' 7 The
judicially fashioned discovery plan should include, in all but the sim-
plest cases, strict time limits and simultaneous discovery in separate
waves. After a first wave limited to discovery of sources of information
(ze., the names of witnesses and the existence, location, and names of
custodians of discoverable documents), successive waves of discovery
should follow on the merits and on any special issues raised by the litiga-
tion."' Trial judges, when determining what constitutes "redundant"
or "excessive" discovery, must consider the importance of the case. Al-
though it is uncertain whether judges have the capacity or fortitude to
enforce the results of such a balancing test,' '9 the government may now
resist the production of relevant documents on the ground that the re-
quests are cumulative or excessively burdensome given the importance
of the case. Closing discovery in this fashion would encourage litigants
to use the FOIA.
113. Advisory Committee Notes to 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 85 F.R.D. 524, 526-27 (1980).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (effective August 1, 1983). For the text of the amended rule, see
97 F.R.D. 165, 168-69 (1983).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3).
116. Id at 16(c)-(e).
117. Id. at 26(b)(1). The 1983 amendments also repealed the final sentence in former Rule
26(a), which left the frequency of discovery to the judgment of the parties, subject only to the
court's authority to issue a protective order.
118. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LEGISLATION, supra note 112, at § 0.50.
119. Because the optimal level of discovery will vary from case to case, there are no abso-
lute boundaries. In the abstract, the limitations can only be said to be analogous to, but
narrower than, the former relevancy limitations. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 84, at
280. In drafting the 1980 amendments, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules rejected a
proposal that would have limited discovery in civil actions to any unprivileged matter rele-
vant to a claim or defense of any party to the proceeding. Id. at 247 n.7.
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.C Production of Documents Under Rule 45
Although Rule 34 only applies to discovery from a party, Rule 45
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to discover doc-
uments from a person who is not a party. To obtain agency records
under this rule, the party serves a notice to take the deposition of the
agency employee who has possession or control of the records and then
serves a subpoena on the deponent to produce the documents. 120 Be-
cause Rule 34 only requires the production of documents in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of a party, 1 2 ' Rule 45 is the only discovery
device available for obtaining agency records in private litigation and in
government litigation to which the agency possessing the desired records
is not a party. With respect to the latter category of cases, the courts
rarely address the status of an agency not named as a party when the
United States or another agency is a named party. Private litigants fre-
quently ask Department of Justice lawyers to produce documents gener-
ated by agencies that are not named parties. If these requests are
sufficiently specific, the Department usually does not limit its search to
its own or client agencies' files, but makes reasonable efforts to produce
documents from throughout the government.
These discovery requests raise legal and practical problems. If only
the United States or agency A is a named party, it is often unclear
whether the records of agency B are within the possession, custody or
control of the named party, and thus discoverable under Rule 34. In
the leading case on this issue, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia held, in United States v. AT&T, 122 that all executive branch agen-
cies were party plaintiffs in an antitrust suit bought by the United
States. ' 23 The court reasoned that unencumbered discovery under Rule
34 was appropriate against executive branch agencies because the gov-
ernment's allegations were wide-ranging and many agencies had partici-
pated in the policy formulation that led to the lawsuit.' 24
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). The party may also subpoena the agency custodian to
produce documentary evidence at a hearing or trial. See id. at 45(b). Subpoenas returnable
at a deposition, on the other hand, are not limited to documentary evidence but may obtain
the production of documents containing matters within the scope of the discovery rules. See
id at 45(d)(1). Most state courts have adopted a comparable rule. Because the federal gov-
ernment is rarely a party to civil actions in the state courts, parties in state court litigation
normally will seek discovery of agency records under rules similar to Rule 45.
121. See id. at 34(a).
122. 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978),
123. Id. at 1334.
124. Id.
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The narrowness of the AT&T court's holding"' confirms the un-
certainty in other government litigation surrounding the status of agen-
cies not named as parties. In some situations, agency B plainly is not a
party within the meaning of Rule 34. The A T&T court itself held that
independent agencies, such as the FCC, are not party plaintiffs in anti-
trust suits brought by the United States because the records of those
agencies are beyond the control of the executive branch.1" 6 Thus, al-
though private parties may rely on the voluntary efforts of government
counsel to obtain records from agencies who may not be parties, one
may wonder whether this search will be as thorough as it would be if the
agency were directly served with a discovery request. Rule 45 allows
such a request, as does the FOIA.
The scope of discovery is the same under Rule 45 and Rule 34, but
Rule 45 procedures are more cumbersome. A party may serve a Rule 34
request on an opposing party through his counsel.' 2 7 Under Rule 45, on
the other hand, the party must identify, subpoena, and depose the
agency official who possesses or controls the records.' 28 While parties
normally do not charge each other fees under Rule 34,129 Rule 45(b)
authorizes a court to condition document discovery from a nonparty on
the discovering party's advancement of reasonable costs.130 Finally,
contempt, the only sanction available for failure to provide discovery
under Rule 45,131 is not likely to be effective against agency officials,
especially high-ranking ones. 132
Agency housekeeping regulations also apply to Rule 45 and state
court subpoenas. The Housekeeping Statute 133 authorizes agencies to
prescribe regulations for the custody, use, and preservation of agency
records. Although a 1958 amendment states that the statute does not
authorize "withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public,"' 3 4 it did not disturb agency regula-
tions which instruct employees not to testify or to produce documents
125. On the narrowness of the AT&T court's holding, see Trane Co. v. Klutznick, 87
F.R.D. 473, 475 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
126. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. at 1335-37.
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b).
128. See id. at 45(d).
129. See supra note 84.
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b).
131. See id. at 45(0.
132. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.61 [5.-1] (2d ed. 1982). The agency may
invoke a housekeeping regulation to vest in the agency head or other high-level official the
decision whether to produce a subpoenaed document.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
134. Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (72
Stat.) 547.
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without the permission of their superiors." 5 Those regulations normally
require document custodians to bring subpoenas to the attention of the
general counsel or other agency official and then to await instruc-
tions.13 6 Some housekeeping regulations permit the custodian to release
records disclosable under the FOIA on his own authority.'3 7 Others re-
quire the discovering party to submit a summary of the information
sought and its relevance to the pending proceeding.1 38 A few agencies
will produce documents without a subpoena; they expect the party's
lawyer to establish the relevance of the records by supplying the plead-
ings or other information about the pending proceeding.13 9 All of the
agencies contacted expressed a willingness to help private litigants by
releasing as much information as they could. Normally, an agency will
negotiate a reasonable accommodation for producing its records, under
a protective order if necessary, to avoid the need for agency employees
to appear and give testimony. No doubt this informal approach makes
the disclosure of records in the hands of nonparty agencies less cumber-
some than it might be, but if an agency resists disclosure the discovering
party must proceed under the inhospitable provisions of Rule 45.
D. Disclosure Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(l)(C) requires the gov-
ernment to disclose, upon the request of a criminal defendant, all docu-
ments and tangible objects in the possession, custody, or control of the
government "which are material to the preparation of his defense or are
intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or
135. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. supra note 132, at §26.61 [4.-2]. For pre-1958
decisions upholding housekeeping regulations and overturning sanctions imposed on agency
custodians who refused to produce subpoenaed documents without the permission of their
superiors, see United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v. Comingore,
177 U.S. 459 (1900).
136. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.11 (e) (1983) (FTC). None of the agencies contacted require, as
the cases cited supra, note 135, seemingly permit, that the discovering party serve a subpoena
on the agency head rather than on a lower level custodian, whom a party often may find
more convenient to serve. But for a case where an agency did use a housekeeping regulation
to bar the production of nonprivileged documents solely because the discovering party sub-
poenaed a subordinate agency employee rather than the agency head, see United States Steel
Corp. v. Mattingly, 89 F.R.D. 301, 302 (D. Colo.), revrd, No. 80-1647 (10th Cir. Aug. 12,
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981), discussed in Lively, Government Housekeeping Authority.
Bureaucratic Privileges with a Bureaucratic Prtivilege, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495, 502-11
(1981).
137. 7 C.F.R. § 1.15 (1983) (Department of Agriculture); 43 C.F.R. § 2.80 (1982) (Depart-
ment of the Interior).
138. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(d) (1982) (Department of Justice) (summary mandatory); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2.21 (1982) (Department of Labor) (departmental officials may waive summary).
139. For example, this is the practice in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in
the Department of the Treasury and at the Federal Reserve Board.
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were obtained from or belong to the defendant." Major problems asso-
ciated with this rule include both the overdisclosure and underdisclosure
of documents.
The first problem resembles that posed by the "boxcar" production
of documents under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but it is aggravated in criminal cases by the absence of pretrial mecha-
nisms (e.g., interrogatories or requests for admissions) for narrowing the
issues. In complex cases, the government often discloses a mass of docu-
ments which the defendant, on account of the Speedy Trial Act, 4 ' has
only 60 to 90 days to review.' 4 ' The defendant's efforts to extract useful
information from the documents may be hampered by the absence of a
"road map" to the government's case and by the government's unwill-
ingness to identify which documents will serve as its exhibits (zle., the
government discloses the documentsfrom which its exhibits will be cho-
sen).14 Although the defendant may obtain a substantial number of
documents, the inability to identify before trial the factual issues in dis-
pute makes the disclosure less useful.
The second problem arises when the defendant requests documents
for his own defense that are not part of the government's case-in-chief
and which it claims are not "material." The rule does not define that
term, and a number of recent cases indicate that it covers little more
than exculpatory material that the prosecutor must disclose anyway
under the Brady doctrine.' 4 3 Another line of cases interprets "material"
more broadly to require the government to disclose all requested docu-
ments relevant to an asserted defense. 144
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 requires the prosecutor to bring the defendant to trial within this
time period.
142. Obermaier, Special Aspects of Litgating White-Collar Criminal Cases, 6 LITIGATION,
Spring, 1980, at 12; Doramus, The White Collar Chafes: Looking for Evidence after Indictment, 6
LITIGATION, Spring, 1980, at 16. For a case holding that the government complied with FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) when it disclosed its entire case file without designating its exhibits,
see United States v. Marino, 639 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1982)
(documents disclosed did not exceed capacity of attorney to read and study in preparation for
a major trial).
143. These cases hold that a document is material under FED. R. GRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C)
only if its disclosure would have significantly altered the quantum of proof in the defendant's
favor. E.g., United States v. Rhoads, 617 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 984, (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1979); United
States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1976); Ross v. United States, 511 F.2d 757,
762-63 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
144. Eg., United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v.
Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1971); United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 469-
470 (N.D. I1. 1967). For an argument that these cases properly interpret FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
and that Ross and its progeny are in error, see Reznick, Pretrial Discovery in the Federal Courts, in
IA CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 10.01[5] (1983).
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Under the narrow interpretation of Rule 16, the government need
not disclose relevant documents (ze., ones that might lead to admissible
evidence) that are available to the public under the FOIA.'4 5 This
anamoly led the trial court in United States v. Brown '46 to order the gov-
ernment to produce relevant documents releasable under the FOIA,
even though the defendant had not made FOIA requests to the agencies
with custody of the records.'4 7 This approach is satisfactory when the
defendant seeks a discrete number of arguably relevant documents, but
a defendant should not be allowed to delay trial by obtaining massive
FOIA-like searches that are unlikely to produce relevant material and
that require the processing of voluminous, and often exempt,
documents. 48
The difference between the two interpretations of Rule 16's materi-
ality requirement may be more apparent than real, however, because
there is no judicial supervision of the government's document disclosures
under the rule. In most districts, the defendant receives what the
United States Attorney decides to disclose. Disclosure policies vary
widely from one prosecutor's office to another; in some, the defendant
obtains access to the prosecutor's whole file while in others he receives
the legal minimum (ie., the government's exhibits plus exculpatory and
Jencks materials). 49 The Manual for Complex Litigation recommends a
more active judicial role in complex criminal cases, but it also recognizes
that voluntary discovery may be equally effective.' 5 ° Thus, a defend-
ant's access to government documents under Rule 16 remains largely a
matter of prosecutorial discretion.
The limitations of Rule 16 have led criminal defendants to use
145. See, e.g., Orzechowski, 547 F.2d at 983-85 (finding immaterial certain internal memo-
randa of the DEA containing policy guidelines for determining whether a substance was an
unlawful isomer of cocaine). The adequacy of the agency's testing procedure was at issue at
trial and the memoranda therefore were plainly relevant. Although the court did not address
the issue, the memoranda do not appear to be exempt under the FOIA. They contained no
deliberative matter (exemption b(5)) and their disclosure would hardly risk circumvention of
statutes or regulations (exemption b(2)). See also Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(en bane).
146. 562 F.2d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 1977).
147. Id. See also United States v. Wahlin, 384 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
148. United States v. Layton, 2 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. 81,390 (N.D. Calif. 1981)
(trial court in criminal case denied defendant's request for a FOIA search for CIA records on
the Jonestown massacre). In Brown, on the other hand, the defendants were charged with
smuggling heroin into a prison. One of the defendants sought to obtain discovery, both under
Rule 16 and under the FOIA, of the Bureau of Prisons' records on the defendants' alleged act.
See also the DeLorean case, discussed in/ia note 246.
149. See Feffer & Abrams, Trial of a Criminal Tax Fraud Case: Prosecution and Defense Perspec-
tives, 6 LITIGATION, Spring, 1980, at 19.
150. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 112, at § 6.10.
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Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for discovery
purposes. That rule permits them to subpoena nonparties (including
federal agencies) to produce relevant documentary evidence in court at
any time prior to trial. Although Rule 17(c) is only supposed to permit
parties to obtain evidence for trial,'5 1 private practitioners assert that it
is an invaluable discovery device in white-collar cases when the prosecu-
tor does not have all the relevant documents or refuses to disclose, on
grounds of immateriality, the documents which he has acquired. 152
Rule 17(c) authorizes the trial court to order the pretrial production of
the subpoenaed documents; but, if the defendant wishes to obtain the
documents prior to trial, it is necessary, or at least advisable, to file a
motion for the issuance of the subpoena. 5 ' In United States v. Jozia, 15
Judge Weinfeld formulated the rigorous showing that the movant must
make to obtain pretrial production:
(1) That the documents are evidentiary and relevant;
(2) That they are not otherwise procurable by the defendant
reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence;
(3) That the defendant cannot properly prepare for trial with-
out such production and inspection in advance of trial and the
failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to de-
lay the trial;
(4) That the application is made in good faith and is not in-
tended as a general fishing expedition.155
Despite the courts' general endorsement of loz'a, practitioners re-
port that substantial document discovery may be obtained under Rule
17(c) if the defendant demonstrates real need. Courts do not expect the
defendant to know the evidentiary value of the documents until he has
seen them and the government has presented its case. Thus, a defend-
ant need not introduce the discovered documents into evidence and may
find some of them more useful than others. While Rule 17(c) is techni-
cally not a discovery device, it serves the same function by allowing the
defendant to obtain documents before trial.
Rule 17(c) subpoenas have two distinct advantages over FOIA re-
quests. First, the defendant may obtain agency records exempt under
the FOIA. A striking example of this occurs in prosecutions for de-
frauding the United States when courts order agencies to produce bank
examiners' reports (exemption b(8)) or internal memoranda (exemption
151. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974).
152. See, e.g., Doramus, supra note 142.
153. 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 274, at 155 (1982).
154. 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
155. Id. at 338.
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b(5)) that reflect what the agency knew, at a particular time, about the
defendant's activities or representations. Second, the defendant may ob-
tain a more timely response under Rule 17(c) than under the FOIA. The
subpoena is returnable prior to trial but there is no assurance that a
FOIA request will receive a similarly timely response, especially from
law enforcement agencies which have significant backlogs of FOIA re-
quests.' 56 The criminal practitioner is thus well advised, in the limited
time between charge and trial, to concentrate document discovery ef-
forts on mastering those obtained from the prosecutor under Rule
16(a) (1) (C) and on seeking through a Rule 17(c) subpoena whatever
other documents he needs.
E. Production of Documents in Agency Adjudication
In 1970, the Administrative Conference recommended that parties
to formal adjudicatory proceedings have access through discovery to all
relevant, unprivileged information.' 57 The recommendation addressed
six discovery tools (including the production of documents and tangible
things) and specified minimum standards for their use. 158 To ensure
that the administrative process remained speedier and less expensive
than the judicial, the Conference assigned a major role to the presiding
officer. With respect to document discovery, the Conference recom-
mended that the parties exchange evidentiary exhibits and witness lists
at a prehearing conference 159 and that the parties be required to apply
to the presiding officer for an order if they wished to obtain the produc-
tion of additional documents."6 Most agencies have substantially com-
plied with the Conference's recommendation for affording full discovery
under the control of the presiding officer. In 1977, fifteen out of the
twenty independent agencies to which the recommendation applied
were in substantial compliance, three were in partial compliance, and
only two (the NLRB and the United States Postal Service) were not in
compliance. 161
Despite this greater availability of discovery in agency adjudica-
tion, parties continue to use the FOIA for discovery purposes. Many
156. One practitioner reports that he filed FOIA requests prior to his client's criminal trial
to obtain information on an agency's control over its informants. Years later, long after the
completion of the trial and appellate process, the agency is still releasing records to him on a
regular basis.
157. ACUS Recommendation 70-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.70-4 (1983).
158. See id.
159. See id. at .70-4(1).
160. See id. at .70-4(6)(b).
161. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION IMPLE-
MENTATION SUMMARY 7-8 (1977).
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agencies still do not authorize the presiding officer to order the parties to
produce relevant documents, thus limiting document discovery from the
agency or other parties to the prehearing exchange of exhibits.16 2
Under this procedure a party only receives notice of an opponent's case,
not documents that might undermine that case or support his own case.
Although at some agencies the presiding officer may use his control over
the parties' prehearing exchange to provide further discovery, 63 the
parties' inability to compel the production of relevant documents natu-
rally encourages the use of the FOIA. The FCC has approved this use of
the FOIA, instructing parties to adjudicatory proceedings to make
FOIA requests whenever they seek document discovery from the
agency. 164 The Commission thus avoids the creation of duplicative dis-
closure mechanisms and retains final authority to make release deci-
sions."' The FDA also uses the FOIA in this manner, but the FDA,
unlike the FCC, lacks subpoena authority from Congress; it is therefore
162. Among the agencies contacted, only the FTC (16 C.F.R. § 3.37 (1983)), the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (16 C.F.R. § 1025.33 (1983)), the NRC (10 C.F.R. § 2.744
(1983)), the Department of Energy (10 C.F.R. § 205.198 (1983)), and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration in the Department of Transportation (49 C.F.R. §511.33
(1983)) explicitly authorize the presiding officer in an adjudicatory proceeding to order a
party (including the agency) to produce relevant documents. At the EPA (40 C.F.R.
§ 22.19(b)(1982)), the SEC (17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d)(1982)), the CFTC (17 C.F.R. § 10;
42(a)(1982)), the FERC (18 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1982)), the Federal Reserve Board (12 C.F.R.
§ 263.6(c)(1983)), the OSHA (29 C.F.R. § 2200.51 (1982)), the Department of Agriculture (7
C.F.R. § 1.140 (1983)), and the FDA (21 C.F.R. § 12.85 (1982)), the presiding officer lacks
that authority, but he may order the parties to exchange their witness lists and documentary
exhibits prior to the hearing. At the FCC, the presiding officer may order private parties to
produce relevant documents, but he may not order the agency to do so (47 C.F.R. § 1.325
(1982)). At the INS, the rules of practice do not provide for discovery but do afford a party or
his attorney prehearing access to the Service's evidence (8 C.F.R. § 292.4(b)(1983)). Attor-
neys at several other agencies report that discovery of the agency's case is available to the
parties to adjudicatory proceedings even though the applicable rules of procedure do not
formally provide for it. Examples include pilot and airplane certificate proceedings before
the National Transportation Safety Board (49 C.F.R. pt. 821 (1982)) and contractor and
grantee debarment proceedings in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (24
C.F.R. pt. 24 (1982)).
163. At the CFTC, for example, the Commission has required the Division of Enforcement
to disclose all exculpatory or Brady material when it submits its case-in-chief. See, e.g. , In re
First Guar. Metals Co., [1980-82 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 21,074
(1980). The presiding officer often conducts a hearing to determine whether the Division has
fulfilled its disclosure obligations. At the FDA, the presiding officer may require a party to
produce all prior reports authored by a witness, or on which the witness relies, under threat of
refusing to permit the witness to testify. At other agencies, such as the Federal Reserve Board,
the presiding officer may engage in considerable jawboning to convince the parties to include
additional relevant documents in their prehearing evidentiary submissions.
164. 47 C.F.R. § 1.325(b) (1982). The Commission's rules do not subject it to orders to
produce documents in adjudicatory proceedings, even when one of its bureaus is a party.
165. The Commission itself determines appeals from initial denials of FOIA requests by
the Executive Director. 47 C.F.R. §0.461(k)(1982). While the Office of the Executive Direc-
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unlikely that a presiding officer at the FDA has statutory authority to
order the agency to produce relevant documents. Thus, if a party to an
FDA adjudicatory proceeding wishes to discover agency records not in-
cluded in the agency's submission of its case, the presiding officer usually
suggests that the party make a FOIA request.
1 66
The Conference's Discovery Recommendation, on the other hand,
recognized that the FOIA cannot satisfy a private party's discovery
needs.1 67 Because a party to an agency adjudication needs more infor-
mation than the public does, he should have greater access than the
public. The FCC recognizes this need when it uses FOIA appeals to
determine the scope of discovery available to a party. In the FOIA ap-
peal of Gilmore Broadcasting Corp. , the Commission held that the
Broadcast Bureau must release certain exempt documents from its inves-
tigatory files to ensure the respondent a fair license revocation hearing.
The Commission then issued a protective order barring the requester
(the respondent in the licensing proceeding) from publicly disclosing
these sensitive documents. This discretionary, nonpublic release of ex-
empt records does not violate the FOIA's "any person access" standard
for nonexempt records. Although most agencies still maintain a uni-
form access policy (ile., all FOIA requesters obtain the same access), 69
the Commission's limited experience demonstrates that an agency may
use FOIA procedures to afford parties to litigation access to agency
records not available to other FOIA requesters.'
70
tor is responsible for all initial denials, it normally follows the recommendations of the operat-
ing bureau with custody of the records (ie., the party to the proceeding).
166. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Agency staff do not have that option and must be content with a private party's submission.
167. The Conference recommended that the presiding officer have authority to order the
agency conducting the proceeding to produce relevant documents. I C.F.R. §305.70-
4(6)(c)(1983). For the discussion in the consultant's report on the inadequacy of the FOIA as
a substitute discovery device, see Tomlinson, Discovery bn Agency Adidication, 1971 DUKE L.J.
89, 133-35.
168. 69 F.C.C.2d 2105 (1978). For other FOIA appeals by parties to formal adjudicatory
proceedings, see New England Broadcasting, Inc., 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1054 (1982); New
England Broadcasting, Inc., 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1418 (1982); Mid-Continent Telecast-
ing, Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 814 (1975).
169. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 20.21 (1982) (FDA).
170. The Commission recently completed an evaluation of its discovery rules and decided
to make only two minor changes. See Discovery Procedures in Adjudicatory Hearings, Fed.
Reg. 51869 (Nov. 18, 1982). Approximately one-fourth of the practitioners who responded to
the Commission's survey indicated that Commission procedures did not afford parties ade-
quate access to Commission files that were not routinely available to the public. The remain-
der of the respondents were either satisfied with present procedures or had no need to use
them. Most respondents did believe, however, that the Commission should establish a discov-
ery procedure affording access, on the basis of need, to Commission records not routinely
available to the public. The respondents also approved the Commission's recent decision
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In addition to affording any discovery required by rule, agencies
have due process obligations. It is generally accepted, for example, that
in enforcement proceedings agencies must disclose exculpatory material
as well as the prior statements of agency witnesses upon completion of
their direct testimony. 1 ' In addition, although the courts generally
have upheld the NLRB's refusal to adopt discovery rules, 1 72 they have
recognized in dicta that a denial of discovery in a particular case may so
prejudice a party as to be a denial of due process. '7 3 What is involved in
these cases is not really a right to prehearing discovery, but the right to
present proof at the hearing itself. Due process includes the right to be
heard in one's own defense' 74 and a due process violation may result if
an agency denies a party access to evidence that is crucial to presenting
that defense.' 75 Thus, a minimum level of discovery may be constitu-
tionally required. '7 6
III. USES OF THE FOIA FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES
Discovery is the most efficient mechanism for obtaining disclosure
of agency documents relevant to a proceeding. Available free of charge,
it ordinarily offers greater access than does the FOIA. Furthermore, an
agency's production of documents in discovery necessarily precedes the
trial or hearing for which the documents are sought. On the other hand,
a litigant making a FOIA request pays the agency's search and duplica-
requiring parties to make discovery requests to the presiding officer for the production of
nonpublic records submitted by private persons before seeking them under the FOIA. See
Central Ala. Broadcasters, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 1762, 1766-67 (1979). For the consultant's report
containing these findings, see M. PAGLIN, REPORT ON EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL COM-
MUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S DISCOVERY PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATORY HEARINGS 61-63
(1982).
171. On the constitutional and statutory bases for theJencks rule in administrative enforce-
ment proceedings, see Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 753-55 (9th Cir.
1964).
172. See, e.g., Trojan Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 947, 948 (6th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951). But see NLRB v. Safeway
Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1969).
173. See NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1976), and cases cited
therein.
174. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1977).
175. The opportunity to be heard includes, in most proceedings, the opportunity to submit
one's proof and to have it considered by the agency decider. See, e.g., Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954).
176. Cf. McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (lack of access by
federal employee in adverse action proceeding to "uniquely relevant" report could, depend-
ing on what the report shows, do "violence to our conception of fair procedure and due
process"); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1983) (denial of discovery
did not result in fundamentally unfair proceeding because alien had access to information by
other means).
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tion costs, obtains the same access as everyone else, and has no assurance
that the agency will release the records in time for the party to use them
in litigation. Nevertheless, parties or potential parties to litigation often
use the FOIA in place of normal discovery procedures. This Part ex-
plores the reasons for those uses and analyzes their impact on the
government.
A. The Use of the FOIA to Obtain Information for a Potential Suit against
the Government
The FOIA provides a mechanism for obtaining the release of
agency records prior to the filing of a lawsuit, at a time when discovery
is not yet available. For example, persons injured in accidents occurring
on federal installations or involving on-duty federal personnel or equip-
ment are naturally interested in obtaining any official reports or regu-
larly kept records (e.g., hospital records or performance records on
equipment) that might shed light on the incident or help determine
whether to file a lawsuit. In most instances the suit would be against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Because the Feres
doctrine bars most suits by servicemen under the Act, 17 7 they often use
the FOIA to determine whether a private manufacturer or supplier of
equipment is a potential defendant. Federal employees contemplating
title VII antidiscrimination suits against the government also use the
FOIA to obtain agency personnel records. Similarly, government con-
tractors, prior to bringing a contract dispute before a Board of Contract
Appeals, routinely use the FOIA to obtain records on contract specifica-
tions or on the agency's disallowance or allocation of the contractor's
Costs. 1
78
Courts have condemned abusive and frivolous lawsuits brought
with nothing more than hope and faith in the discovery process. 179 The
FOIA thus serves an important function in assisting potential litigants to
determine whether they have a valid claim. Former Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure provided that an attorney's signature on a
pleading constituted a certification that he had read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there was
"good ground to support it."'"1 In 1983, the Supreme Court amended
177. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
178. Boards of Contract Appeals afford discovery similar in scope to that available in the
district courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Peacock, Dscovey Before Boards of
Contract Appeals, 13 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 1 (1982).
179. Eg., Rhinehart v. Stauffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. Cryavoc,
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431, 431 (D. Mass 1983).
180. Courts construed the "good ground" requirement to apply to both the factual and
legal elements of the complaint. See, e.g., Heart Disease Research Found. v. GM, 15 Fed. R.
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Rule 11 to strengthen the certification requirement. By signing a plead-
ing, the attorney now certifies not only his belief that the pleading is
"well grounded in fact," but also that he has formed that belief after
"reasonable inquiry."'' The new rule, as well as the majority of the
cases interpreting the former rule, require an attorney to conduct a pre-
liminary factual investigation prior to filing a complaint. On occasion it
will be necessary for an attorney to obtain publicly available agency
records to corroborate the basis for a client's claim. The FOIA provides
a mechanism for obtaining that corroboration and fullfilling the Rule
11 obligation.
Prelitigation use of the FOIA for discovery purposes also occurs
when a litigant already has an adequate factual basis for a claim. Many
FOIA requesters, having decided to bring suit, merely wish to discover
relevant agency records earlier than normal discovery procedures would
permit. For these litigants, the FOIA provides an effective, relatively
inexpensive, and, in most cases, surprisingly speedy tool for obtaining
relevant documents from government hospitals, military bases, and
other federal installations. This prelitigation use of the FOIA occurs
routinely in tort, employment discrimination, and contract suits against
the government.
Government lawyers representing agencies in litigation are ambiva-
lent about the use of the FOIA as a discovery tool when reciprocal dis-
covery is not available. Some believe it unfair because they must work
hard to "catch up" on discovery while their better prepared adversaries
push for an early trial date. Others argue that a potential litigant's ac-
cess to more complete information may convince the litigant not to file
suit or to accept an early settlement. All seem to agree that the govern-
ment suffers no prejudice that it cannot overcome with hard work. The
government lawyers' principal concern is that the litigant may obtain
agency records that are privileged in the discovery context (e.g., confi-
dential safety investigations).
B. The Use ofthe FOIA to Obtain Information about a Potential
Governmental Proceeding against the Requester
The government must also investigate the factual basis of its case
before bringing suit. Quite often, a potential defendant learns of an in-
vestigation before the government initiates a formal action or proceed-
ing: The arrival of an IRS special agent alerts the taxpayer that he is
Serv. 2d 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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the subject of a criminal tax investigation; a friend informs a corporate
officer that a SEC investigator has interviewed him and shown him the
Commission's order of investigation naming the officer; the government
serves the subject with a subpoena or other investigatory demand. In all
these situations, the requester may use the FOIA defensively to attempt
to discover what the government knows." 2
Although the requester may use the information obtained through
the FOIA to prepare for an eventual trial or hearing, the availability of
the FOIA is more significant for purposes of prelitigation advocacy be-
cause the requester will have access to discovery once the government
initiates an enforcement proceeding. Criminal tax practitioners confirm
that the most effective advocacy in criminal tax cases occurs before in-
dictment when the defense attorney has an opportunity to convince gov-
ernment attorneys not to proceed criminally. Similar preindictment
advocacy, often in the form of plea bargaining, occurs in the defense of
white-collar crime. Such advocacy, to be effective, must be based on
adequate information. 183
Persons under investigation do not obtain much useful information
under the FOIA. An agency may withhold investigatory records under
exemption b(7)(A), if the release of the records would "interfere with"
prospective or pending enforcement proceedings.'8 4 The exemption
does not afford blanket protection to open investigatory files, but, as a
practical matter, FOIA requesters obtain very little useful information
on the factual or legal basis for an ongoing investigation. Usually, the
most useful information obtained is confirmation of whether the re-
quester is under investigation. For example, following an inspection by
the OSHA, an employer may file a FOIA request for the inspector's
report. If the agency withholds the report on the basis of exemption
b(7)(A), the employer knows it is the subject of an investigation. The
agency's description of the records withheld may communicate addi-
tional useful information on the scope or status of the investigation. By
filing subsequent requests at regular intervals, the employer may learn
182. The FOIA 'requester may simultaneously file a Privacy Act request, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(d)(1982), which affords the requester access to personal records that the agency must
withhold from the general public under FOIA exemption b(6).
183. Among the contacted agencies, the IRS, the Tax and Antitrust Divisions in the De-
partment of Justice, the Department of Energy, the FTC, the CFTC, and the SEC report
substantial use of the FOIA by persons under investigation. The requesters are seeking
agency records pertaining to the individual requester (ie., the investigatory file), law enforce-
ment manuals or other internal guidelines describing the steps in the investigatory process,
agency rulings or statements of policy on enforcement matters, and other records that contain
information on investigatory policies and enforcement techniques.
184. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978).
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whether the agency has terminated the investigation in its favor. An
employer also may obtain information on the focus of a complex health
investigation by securing the release of factual studies prepared by the
agency which identify the practices under scrutiny."5
The 1974 FOIA amendments that narrowed the investigatory
records exemption 186 prompted widespread efforts by persons under in-
vestigation, particularly potential respondents in unfair labor practice
proceedings before the NLRB, to use the FOIA to discover records in
investigatory files. In NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. ,I87 the Supreme
Court squelched those efforts. The Court found that although Congress
amended exemption b(7) to clarify that the exemption did not "end-
lessly protect" investigatory material,' 8 Congress intended to protect
prospective enforcement proceedings from any harm caused by the pre-
mature release of evidence and information. 8 9 Thus, exemption
b(7) (A) does not require agencies to establish "interference with enforce-
ment proceedings" on a document-by-document basis but allows them
to withhold whole categories of sensitive records in open investigatory
files."° Lower courts have applied this categorical approach to permit
agencies to withhold witness statements, documentary evidence, agents'
reports and work papers, and internal memoranda that were compiled
for law enforcement purposes.19 1 Any agency may withhold these
records even though the requester may eventually obtain them through
discovery in an enforcement proceeding.'92 Withholding is also permis-
sible if the records would be privileged in discovery (e.g., they are privi-
leged work product), because in that case their release "would increase a
185. General studies on health hazards are not exempt investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes.
186. Exemption b(7), as originally enacted in 1966, permitted the withholding of"investi-
gatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
private party." The amended exemption permits the withholding of investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement purposes only to the extent that the release of the records
would result in one of six specified harms. The first listed harm is interference with enforce-
ment proceedings.
187. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
188. ld. at 230.
189. Id. at 232.
190. Id. at 236. Robbbns Tire thus afforded categorical protection to witness statements in
unfair labor practice proceedings.
191. E.g., Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268, 1272-74 (8th Cir. 1980); Parker/Hunter, Inc. v.
SEC, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,873 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1981); Fed-
ders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F. Supp. 325, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980);
OKC Corp. v. Williams, 489 F. Supp. 576, 586 (N.D. Tex.) affd, 614 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Hunt v. CFTC, 484 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.D.C. 1979); Steinberg v.
IRS, 463 F. Supp. 1272, 1273-74 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Grabinski v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 486, 487
(E.D. Mo. 1979).
192. Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1134, 1137-38 (D.D.C. 1980).
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defendant's resources and thereby weaken and interfere with the gov-
ernment's efforts in an enforcement action."'
9 3
Private practitioners confirm the limited utility of the FOIA for dis-
covering the substance of the government's case against a person under
investigation.' 94 Leading criminal tax practitioners report that they no
longer make FOIA requests to the IRS or to the Tax Division for records
pertaining to their clients because they have never obtained the release
of any useful records. 9 ' The NLRB reports that FOIA requests by re-
spondents in unfair labor practice proceedings slowed significantly after
the Robbins Tire decision. None of the criminal practitioners interviewed
use the FOIA to obtain precharge discovery of the government's case,
and the use of the FOIA to obtain access to open investigatory files in
criminal cases is in fact comparatively rare.t96
193. Kantner v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
194. Although agencies are able to withhold most of the requested records, persons under
investigation continue to make FOIA requests because they have nothing to lose: They may
obtain useful information; if they do not, they will incur no significant fees because most
agencies do not charge requesters for search time for withheld records. Lawyers responsible
for FOIA matters at the IRS, the Tax, Antitrust, and Criminal Divisions in the Justice De-
partment, the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC confirm that they are able to prevent the release
of sensitive investigatory records but cite the annoyance and effort involved in responding to
FOIA requests by persons under investigation. Enforcement attorneys also object to the dis-
traction of working with the agency's FOIA staff, but the post-Robbins Tire case law contains
few if any instances where a court has ordered an agency to release records from an open file
to a person under investigation. See cases cited supra note 191. See also Lively, supra note 48,
at 79 (discussing burden for exemption b(7)).
195. They attribute the continuation of FOIA requests by persons under investigation to
the ease of making requests and to the stories within the profession of occasional "surprise"
releases of useful information. None of the literature on discovery in criminal tax cases offers
much encouragement on the use of the FOIA. See Culverhouse, Defending Criminal Tax Trials:
Discovey Strategy, 18 TRIAL, May, 1982, at 52; Feffer and Abrams, supra note 149, at 19;
Garbis, Defenses and Discovery in Tax Fraud investi'gations , 10 CUM. L. REV. 655 (1980). In addi-
tion, two leading practitioners' treatises discourage its use. See H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND
EVASION § 12.07[4] (5th ed. 1983) (FOIA "affords very little use to defendants in tax-related
prosecutions"); R. FINK, TAX FRAUD: AUDIT, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION (1980).
196. In 1981, the FBI denied in whole or in part only 294 requests for records in open
investigatory files (exemption b(7)(A)), while it denied in whole or in part 1912 requests for
investigatory records to protect personal privacy (exemption b(7)(C)) and 1452 requests for
investigatory records to protect a confidential source (exemption b(7)(D)). The former ex-
emption applies only to open files, while the latter two exemptions apply to closed files. OF-
FICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1981). During 1982, the FBI invoked exemption b(7)(A) on 228 occa-
sions and exemptions b(7)(C) and b(7)(D) on 1268 and 1034 occasions respectively. Id
Other law enforcement agencies report a similar imbalance with more withholdings based on
exemptions b(7)(C) and b(7)(D)) than on exemption b(7)(A). In 1981, the Drug Enforcement
Administration invoked exempti~n b(7)(A) on 81 occasions and exemptions b(7)(C) and
b(7)(D) on 229 and 264 occasions respectively. The Criminal Division invoked exemption
b(7)(A) only 34 times, while it invoked exemptions b(7)(C) and b(7)(D) 315 and 130 times
respectively. Id.
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The FBI and the DEA contend that criminals and their accom-
plices do not use the FOIA for legitimate discovery purposes but to
evade detection, to derail investigations by uncovering and driving
away informants, and to uncover and kill informants.1 97 These abuses
are primarily associated with FOIA requests for records in closed files
where the existing exemptions may not be adequate to prevent the re-
lease of sensitive information. For records in closed investigatory files, a
law enforcement agency cannot invoke exemption b(7)(A) to prevent
premature discovery of the government's case, but can only withhold
information to protect a confidential source (exemption b(7)(D)) or to
protect personal privacy (exemption b(7)(C)). In accordance with these
exemptions, the agency can redact the names of witnesses and agents
and any other information that would disclose the identity of a confi-
dential source or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy,19 but the agency must release most other requested records from a
closed file. Because the requester obtains records containing a good deal
of factual information,' 99 he can often combine that information with
other known information to determine the identity of an informant.2 ° °
The proper response to this abuse is not to restrict the use of the FOIA,
but to enact a new exemption affording blanket protection for a certain
number of years to organized crime or similar investigatory files. 20 ' The
cause of the problem is the inadequacy of the exemptions and not the
use of the Act for discovery purposes.
Finally, persons under investigation have been able to obtain under
the FOIA law enforcement manuals and records containing information
about the agency's position on enforcement matters. These records are
197. 1 Hearings, supra note 19, at 843 (testimony of FBI Director William H. Webster); id.
at 1081 (submission of Acting DEA Administrator Francis M. Mullen, Jr.).
198. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); Radowich v. United
States Att'y, 658 F.2d 957, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1981).
199. The agency normally need not release factual information from an open file because
to do so would interfere with enforcement proceedings by indicating the scope of the
investigation.
200. FBI Director Webster has warned of the "green sedan phenomenon," which can oc-
cur when the agency discloses to a FOIA requester a seemingly innocuous bit of information
(e.g., the fact that the witness drove a green sedan). The requester, in light of other informa-
tion known to him, can acertain the identity of the information's source. For Director Web-
ster's remarks before the American Bar Association, see National Security, Law Enforcement, and
Business Secrets Under the FOIA, 38 Bus. LAW. 705, 711 (1982) (remarks of Director William H.
Webster) [hereinafter cited as National Security], and for his remarks before the Congress in the
1981 Hearings on the FOIA, see I Hearings, supra note 19, at 843.
201. Most of the recent bills introduced in the Congress to amend the FOIA have included
provisons granting the government blanket authority to withhold organized crime records for
a certain number of years. The FBI desires similar blanket protection for terrorism and for-
eign counter-intelligence files. See National Security, supra note 200, at 711.
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normally not investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses, and the agency must release them unless it can invoke the exemp-
tion for internal personnel rules and practices (exemption b(2)) or for
deliberative materials (exemption b(5)). Under exemption b(2), the
agency may withhold a law enforcement manual only if it is "predomi-
nately internal" and if its disclosure raises significant risks of "circum-
venting agency regulations or statutes. ' '2 ° 2 Under exemption b(5), the
agency may withhold predecisional matter, but it must release records
which embody agency policy or explain action already taken by the
agency. 20 3 The limited scope of these exemptions may permit a person
under investigation to learn how the agency conducts its investigations
and how it has resolved similar matters in the past. That information
may be useful in persuading a government attorney not to institute for-
mal enforcement proceedings.
C The Use of the FOIA to Obtain Agency Generated Records for Use in
Private Litigation
Two general categories of agency records are often relevant to pri-
vate litigation to which the government is not a party: records gener-
ated by the government and records submitted to the government by
private persons. The records in the first category are most often in the
government's exclusive possession, but a private person submitting doc-
uments to the government usually retains copies. Thus, the purpose of
the FOIA requester in seeking the two types of records may be quite
different. In the former case the requester is seeking discovery from the
government, while in the latter case he is really seeking it from the
submitter.
Parties to litigation frequently use the FOIA to obtain records in
the first category, and this seldom raises problems. Agency files contain
much government generated data on health, economic, and environ-
mental matters that may be relevant to private litigation. Both plain-
tiffs and defendants use the FOIA to obtain governmental investigative
reports which, although not themselves admissible as evidence, often
provide useful leads on the basis of liability or defenses. 204 Litigants
202. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d, 1051, 1074 (D.C. Cir.
1981)(en banc).
203. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866-8 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
204. Agencies such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the OSHA,
the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission
prepare investigative reports on accidents that occur on highways, in workplaces, or in a
consumer's home. Exemption b(7) does not cover these reports because the agencies do not
compile them for law enforcement purposes.
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naturally seek to obtain these reports as quickly as possible-usually
prior to the commencement of litigation-and the FOIA provides ear-
lier access to agency records than does discovery.2 °5
Agency personnel often prefer private litigants to use the FOIA be-
cause responding to a FOIA request is more convenient than responding
to a Rule 45 or state court subpoena. The agency has a mechanism in
place for processing FOIA requests and may make a FOIA release with-
out concerning itself about a discovery court's time limits and demands
for authentication. In the case of a subpoena, the agency's lawyer must
reassure the often distraught subpoenaed employees and must negotiate
a reasonable disclosure mechanism which eliminates, if possible, the
need for any testimony by agency officials. The Department of Labor
thus treats a subpoena for a compliance officer's report the same as a
FOIA request,0 6 ie., the Department processes the subpoena in the
same fashion and "cuts" the same material from the document, thus
affording the subpoenaing party no greater access than the FOIA re-
quester.2"7 Of course, upon a showing of need, a party may obtain
through discovery greater access to agency records than a FOIA re-
quester. Department of Labor officials recognize that a discovery court
may order the production of a compliance officer's report without the
FOIA redactions, but they do not recall that ever having occurred. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the Department of the
Treasury likewise treats subpoenas for nonexempt records the same as
FOIA requests, but it produces bank examiners' reports covered by ex-
205. The Consumer Product Safety Commission's FOIA procedures are an exception. Sec-
tion 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1982), requires the Com-
mission to take reasonable steps to assure the accuracy of product information disclosures and
to afford manufacturers a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the Commission
before disclosure. The Supreme Court has held that these statutory requirements apply to
FOIA releases. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1979).
Exemption b(3) authorizes the agency to withhold the records during the comment process.
Id. FOIA requesters must wait six months to a year to obtain the release of accident reports
subject to section 6(b) procedures. Although other agencies are not subject to similar con-
straints, the targets of allegedly inaccurate reports have occasionally sought to enjoin their
release by the agency. See Reagan Bush Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n, 525 F.
Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1980) (court refused to enjoin release of audit report).
206. Unless further enforcement proceedings are contemplated, the Department will re-
lease under the FOIA a compliance officer's report on an industrial accident after redacting
the officer's recommendations and the names of informants. Miles v. Department of Labor,
546 F. Supp. 437, 440-41 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Lloyd & Henniger v. Marshall, 526 F. Supp. 485,
487 (M.D. Fla. 1981). See also New England Apple Council, Inc. v. Donovan, 560 F. Supp.
231, 235 (D. Mass. 1983) (routine redaction of officer's name impermissible under exemption
b (7) (C)).
207. The Department of Agriculture also processes subpoenas for nonexempt agency
records as FOIA requests. 7 C.F.R. § 1.15 (1983).
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emption b(8) only under court order.2"' Under its housekeeping regula-
tion, 2" the Office of the Comptroller will disclose exempt records
without formal service of a subpoena upon the agency custodian, but a
party must establish by affidavit that litigation is pending and that he
needs the report for litigation purposes.
The common sense approach of these agencies supports the conclu-
sion that parties to private litigation should be able to use the FOIA for
discovery purposes. A party should be required to use a subpoena only
to obtain exempt agency records; neither the party nor the agency
should be subjected to the more burdensome discovery procedures of
Rule 45 or of analagous state court rules, if the party seeks only first
level access to agency records.
If a party uses the FOIA to augment prior or simultaneous Rule 45
discovery, different issues arise. Supplemental use of the FOIA chiefly
occurs in complex litigation and raises few problems if all the relevant
documents are in the custody of a single or limited number of individu-
als210 so that the government has to produce the documents only once.
If the relevant documents, or copies thereof, are scattered in hundreds of
federal offices and installations throughout the country, the situation is
somewhat different. Duplicitous searches and a loss of control over doc-
ument production, two of the resulting problems, are discussed below.
21
D. The Use of the FOIA to Obtain Privately Submitted Agency Records for
Use in Private Litigation
The use of the FOIA by a party or potential party to private litiga-
tion to obtain the second category of agency records (Le., records sub-
mitted to the government by private persons) raises a number of special
problems because the party is actually seeking discovery from the pri-
vate submitter. The agencies most frequently encountering this use of
the FOIA are those which investigate business conduct that may subse-
quently become the subject of private antitrust, securities, or other com-
mercial litigation.21 2 In the course of the investigation, the agency,
through compulsory process or voluntary submissions, obtains many
208. The court normally issues a protective order.
209. 12 C.F.R. § 4.19 (1983).
210. Thus, in Colonel Hebert's and General Westmoreland's libel suits against CBS, all of
the relevant documents on the Vietnam War were in several military records centers. It was a
matter of indifference to the military departments whether the parties sought the records
through Rule 45 subpoenas or FOIA requests.
211. For a discussion of these issues, see inra Part III(G).
212. Among the agencies contacted, the Antitrust Division, the FTC, the SEC, the CFTC,
the Department of Energy, and the Federal Reserve Board have encountered this use of the
FOIA.
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documents from persons under investigation and other persons with rel-
evant evidence. Government files thus became repositories of docu-
ments of interest to parties to private litigation.
Once private litigation commences, a party may seek discovery di-
rectly from the private submitter, but discovery of the documents from
the government is often more efficient. This form of discovery is analo-
gous to the phenomenon of second degree discovery that has become
widespread in recent years. Under that approach, a party may discover
documents discovered by another party to an earlier action from that
other party so long as the documents would be discoverable in the subse-
quent action from the persons who originally afforded the discovery.
Proponents of second degree discovery argue that it is inefficient to re-
quire a party to rediscover documents that another party has already
discovered in an earlier action. 13
Despite the apparent analogy, government investigatory files differ
from a prior party's first degree discovery files. The government did not
obtain the documents through discovery in litigation but through an
investigatory process in which the government's power to compel is ex-
tensive and the individual's ability to resist limited. Whether the gov-
ernment's files should be available to a private litigant under the FOIA
or only under court subpoena is less important than whether they
should be available at all: Should the government transfer its investiga-
tory advantage, which is based on society's paramount interest in law
enforcement, to private parties for litigation purposes? If the transfer is
justified, it does not make much difference whther it occurs through dis-
covery or under the FOIA.
Courts generally permit both plaintiffs and defendants in private
litigation to obtain privately submitted, unprivileged documents from
the government through a Rule 45 subpoena.2 14 The government's par-
213. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 84, at 284-91; Note, Non-party Access to Discovery Materi-
als in the Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1089-91 (1981); Comment, Government Use of
Civil Investigative Demand to Obtain Materials Discovered in Private Antitrust Litigation, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 804 (1979). For cases granting second degree discovery, see United States v. GAF
Corp., 596 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1966). In GAF, the court upheld the Antitrust Division's use
of a civil investigative demand (CID) to obtain second degree discovery from a private anti-
trust plaintiff. Congress codified that result in the 1980 amendments to the Antitrust Civil
Process Act. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 2(b)(1)-
(3), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (194 Stat.) 1154 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1312
(1982)).
214. See Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 766-67 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Friedman v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc., Misc. No. 83-0026 (D.D.C. 1983) (plaintiff's motion to compel the non-
party CFTC to produce privately submitted records denied because plaintiff failed to prove
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amount interest "in having justice done between litigants in the federal
courts militates in favor of requiring a great effort on its part to produce
any documents relevant to a fair termination of [the] litigation."2 '5 A
discovery court may protect the government from unduly burdensome
requests by considering, when determining whether a subpoena directed
at the government is unreasonable or oppressive, whether the discover-
ing party has made full use of discovery procedures to obtain the re-
quested documents in a more efficient way. But the availability of
discovery from the document's author or submitter does not bar the issu-
ance of a subpoena against the government.2 1 6
Congress has on occasion barred the disclosure of privately submit-
ted agency records. In the Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962,217 Con-
gress established elaborate custodianship provisions to ensure the
confidentiality of documents submitted to the Antitrust Division in re-
sponse to a civil investigative demand (CID). The 1976 amendments to
the Act further guaranteed this confidentiality by exempting privately
submitted documents from disclosure under the FOIA21" and by stating
in the legislative history that the documents were not discoverable under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except by a submitter who became
a defendant in an antitrust suit brought by the government. 2 '9 The An-
titrust Division therefore cannot release CID material to a nonsubmitter
under the FOIA or in response to a discovery subpoena. Furthermore,
the submitter may obtain the return of the original documents (but not
of any copies properly made by the government) upon completion of
any governmental action or proceeding involving the documents or, if
the government has not commenced an action or proceeding, within a
reasonable time.2 2° In the Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act of 1980,221 Congress similarly restricted discovery of documents sub-
mitted to the Commission in response to a CID. Except for requests for
disclosure to Congress, federal agencies, or state officials, the Commis-
sion may disclose these documents only in "Commission adjudicatory
that the records were not discoverable from the private submitters). The Friedman case is now
on appeal.
215. Westinghouse, 351 F.2d at 767.
216. Id. at 767 n.8.
217. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(76 Stat.) 548 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1982)).
218. Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 104(e), 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (90 Stat.) 1389 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1314 (1982)).
219. H.R. REP. No. 94-1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprztted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2572, 2609-10.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1982).
221. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §13, 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS (94 Stat.) 374, 380-85 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (1982)).
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proceedings or in judicial proceedings to which the Commission is a
party." '2 22 Only documents submitted pursuant to compulsory process
(te., a CID) are thus protected. Another section in the same Act, how-
ever, exempts from release under the FOIA (but not from subpoenas) all
records submitted to the Commission in the course of an
investigation.22 3
In the absence of a statutory provision analogous to those applica-
ble to the Antitrust Division and the FTC, a party to litigation may seek
privately submitted records either by a FOIA request or by a third party
subpoena served on the agency custodian. A private litigant's choice of
the FOIA to obtain records presents two problems to those who have
submitted documents. First, a submitter does not know what docu-
ments an adversary may have obtained under the FOIA. Second, an
agency may release FOIA-exempt records that contain trade secrets or
other confidential business information (exemption b(4)). The former
problem is a common one in litigation; a party often does not know
what information an opposing party previously has obtained. Discovery
permits a party to learn whether an opponent has made any FOIA re-
quests.24 The Administrative Conference addressed the latter problem
in Recommendation 82-1, adopted in June, 1982.225 The Conference
recommended that Congress amend the FOIA to require agencies to no-
tify a submitter prior to the release of any records that the submitter
designated as confidential. 226 The Recommendation did not address the
disclosure of trade secrets or confidential business information in re-
sponse to discovery subpoenas, but the consultant's report intimates that
this problem did not exist in that context.2 27
Despite the concern over the use of the FOIA to obtain trade
secrets or confidential business information, the FOIA should remain
open to parties to private litigation seeking first level access to privately
submitted agency records. Parties seeking access to these records are not
222. Id. at § 14, (94 Stat.) 387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(d)(1)(c)(1982)).
223. Id. at § 14, (94 Stat.) 388 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(0(1982)).
224. FOIA requests are themselves public records and therefore do not deserve work-prod-
uct protection.
225. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-1 (1983).
226. The notice provision affords submitters an opportunity to file with the agency written
objections to the agency's release of the records and to seek de novo review in the courts of the
agency's release decision. The Conference believed that these additional safeguards were nec-
essary to protect the interests of submitters because the FOIA process encouraged agencies to
withhold "only those items which the agency itself needs to defend-and private documents
are more likely to be given up by the agency to avoid prolonged litigation by requesters."
O'Reilly, Regaining a Confidence: Protection of Busbiess Confidential Data Through Reform of the Free-
dom of Information Act, 34 AD. L. REv. 263, 303 (1982).
227. See id. at 269-70 ("judicial protection" will attach).
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engaged (as other FOIA requesters may be) in legalized industrial espio-
nage but are seeking evidence for use in litigation. Often, they are seek-
ing to determine whether any basis for a lawsuit exists. Only a small
percentage of the records sought are likely to contain either common-
law trade secrets or trade secrets and confidential business information
exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption b(4). The records are
evidence of past business behavior; their staleness2 2 makes it unlikely
that disclosure will afford a nonlitigation advantage to the submitter's
competitors. Furthermore, the Conference has recognized that it is pos-
sible to develop FOIA procedures to protect confidential business infor-
mation in agency files.229 Although Congress has yet to act on the
Conference's recommendation, most agencies have voluntarily adopted
procedures to protect the interests of submitters.
In addition, trade secrets and confidential business information are
unlikely to receive increased protection from unwarranted disclosure in
discovery. Statutes and agency rules, with few exceptions, do not re-
quire an agency to notify a submitter prior to producing a document in
response to a discovery subpoena. 230 The agency need not, and perhaps
cannot, raise any claim of privilege on behalf of the submitter.231 Even
if the agency records contain common-law trade secrets, the agency's
disclosure in response to a subpoena is authorized by law and thus does
228. As a practical matter, private litigants can only obtain the release of agency records
from closed investigatory files. If a litigant seeks the release of records from a fresh or open
file, the agency will invoke exemption b(7)(A). Thus, it is likely that any records released to
the litigant will pertain to events that took place several years in the past.
229. Recommendation 82-1, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-1 (1983).
230. Section 222(5) of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 2294, 2310,amending 7 U.S.C. § 12(0 (1982), is one of the
few statutes expressly requiring an agency to notify a submitter that it has received a court
subpoena for information submitted by the submitter. The CFTC must give the submitter
fourteen days notice before disclosing the information. The FTC has committed itself by rule
to afford a submitter an opportunity to seek a protective order before it releases privately
submitted materials in "Commission administrative or court proceedings." 16 C.F.R.
§ 4.10(g)(1983). In the past, the Commission, when issuing adjudicatory subpoenas, has
agreed to notify the submitter before releasing confidential information in response to an
official Congressional request or to the compulsory process of a court. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v.
FTC, 665 F.2d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
231. In In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47, 59 (W.D.
Pa. 1977), the court held that a private party had no standing to object that the documents
which the court ordered it to produce were secret Canadian government documents. The
court, however, did order the party's counsel to notify the Canadian government so that it
might seek confidential treatment for the documents. But see Overby v. United States Fidelity
and Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1955) (government may assert privilege to
prevent production by bank of bank examiner's report in bank's possession).
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not violate the Trade Secrets Act.23 2 Agencies do not have established
procedures for responding to subpoenas seeking the production of pri-
vately submitted documents and are subject to the same incentives as in
the FOIA context to surrender the documents without a fight. In prac-
tice, agency counsel attempt to contact the submitter before disclosing
any documents, but often counsel does not have sufficient time to give
effective notice and can do no more than inform the court that the sub-
poenaed documents contain information for which the private submitter
might desire a protective order.2 33 A submitter who is not a party to the
litigation may encounter difficulty in securing a protective order when
the agency produces the records because there is no clear authority rec-
ognizing the submitter's status as the real party in interest.2 34 Thus, the
absence of discovery safeguards similar to the FOIA safeguards pro-
posed in Conference Recommendation 82-1 makes it difficult to argue
that trade secrets and other confidential business information receive ef-
fective protection in the discovery context.
Counsel for the agencies contacted report that private litigants em-
ploy both FOIA requests and discovery subpoenas to gain access to pri-
vately submitted agency records and generally obtain the same
documents in both instances.2 35 Although discovery may afford access
to exempt records, a party often can obtain that access through a FOIA
request. For example, if it is obvious that certain confidential business
information in agency files is relevant to pending litigation, the submit-
ter and the FOIA requester normally agree to the agency's production
of the records under a protective order.2 36 Closing the FOIA to requests
232. See Canal Auth. v. Froehlke, 81 F.R.D. 609, 612-13 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Pleasant Hill
Bank v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 97, 98 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
233. Even if the submitter is a party to the private litigation in which the records are
sought, he has no assurance that he will receive notice of an opposing party's service on an
agency custodian of a third party subpoena. If the submitter is not a party to the litigation,
he will receive notice only if the agency or the court chooses to give it to him.
234. In the analogous context of efforts by private litigants to obtain access to grand jury
materials under FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), the Supreme Court has recognized the standing of the
submittees to challenge the disclosure. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S.
211, 218 n.8 (1979)("release of the transcripts to their civil adversaries could result in substan-
tial harm to them").
235. Private antitrust plaintiffs and defendants do not receive under the FOIA the CID
material available only to defendants in government antitrust suits. Motion Picture Ass'n of
Am. v. Department of Justice, 80 Civ. 6612 (S.D.N.Y.). Antitrust Division lawyers report
that persons under investigation are insisting with greater frequency that the Division use the
cumbersome CID machinery to obtain the submission of documents. They estimate that
voluntary submissions now comprise less than one-half of the documents obtained by the
Division. The submitters' increased concern for confidentiality naturally reduces the utility
to private litigants of the Division's investigatory files.
236. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the key issue in most such cases is not
whether trade secrets or confidential business information will be disclosed, but under what
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for records generated by private submitters therefore would serve no
purpose.
E The Use of the FOIA to Obtain Agency Records Unavailable in Dzscoveqy
Because They Are Privileged
Inadvertent or careless FOIA releases of exempt records are a rar-
ity.2 37 More frequently, the public information officer's release decision
is, in the words of government litigators, "mistaken." It is perhaps more
accurate to say that the officer's perspective on claiming an exemption is
different than that of a litigating attorney. This difference is particu-
larly apparent with respect to the deliberative process component of ex-
emption b(5). The public information officer's job is to release as much
information as possible, while the attorney's job is to defend the govern-
ment's position in litigation. The attorney is particularly sensitive about
releasing internal documents critical of the agency's present position or
advocating a contrary position; public information officers and lower
level program people are likely to be less sensitive. In addition, delibera-
tive process and work-product claims have special cogency when raised
in litigation and lose much of their force when considered in the abstract
in response to a FOIA request.
Government counsel are nearly unanimous in their condemnation
of the parallel use of the FOIA for "backdoor" discovery from the gov-
ernment during the pendency of litigation. They fear that they will lose
control over the flow of documents to the other parties and that their
opponents will obtain the release of privileged documents, or of docu-
ments that can be used to surprise the government at trial or hearing.
FOIA requests by opposing counsel particularly irk Department of Jus-
tice lawyers because they believe that counsel should not communicate
directly with the client agency on matters that are in litigation, but
should address all communications to the Department. 38 A number of
agencies have responded by adopting procedures which involve litigat-
conditions they will be disclosed. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 2043, at 305
(1970).
237. But see infra notes 307, 308 and accompanying text.
238. This latter, ethical objection is unfounded because DR 7-104(A)(1) only prohibits
counsel from communicating with a "party" whom he knows to be represented by a lawyer
on the subject matter of the communication. While this disciplinary rule does apply to com-
munications between lawyers representing private parties and government officials, the gov-
ernment officials covered by the prohibition of communications with a "party" include only
those officials who have the power to commit or bind the government with respect to the
subject matter in question. Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, Op. No.
80 (1979) (interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) on "Communicating With One of Adverse Interest").
A public information officer is not such an official.
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ing attorneys in the FOIA process.139
Although most courts have analyzed the issues raised by claims of
privilege in discovery and exemptions under the FOIA as "separate is-
sues" requiring "separate analysis," 2 4  a minority of courts have held
that the government cannot raise a claim of privilege in defense to a
discovery subpoena if it would be required to release the documents
under the FIOA. In Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. L TO. Corp. ,241 the
court enforced a Rule 45 subpoena to produce the conclusions as well as
the factual portions of an accident report against a Department of La-
bor compliance officer. After ruling, perhaps erroneously,2 42 that the
Department could not withhold any portion of the report under the
FOIA, the court held that the government could not raise a claim of
privilege for a document that is already in the public domain. "It is
sufficient for us to hold that Rule 26(b) does not authorize an agency to
withhold any records which the Act commands it to disclose. ' 243 The
court in Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Coleman2 44 reached a similar conclu-
sion. Ruling on discovery motions in an action for preenforcement re-
view of a federal motor vehicle safety standard, the court held that
"[i]nformation which the government must disclose to the public gener-
ally may not be withheld from a member of the public who engages the
government in litigation. "245 In Firestone, unlike in Moore-McCormack,
the discovering party had filed FOIA requests with the agency for the
records which it subsequently moved the court to compel the agency to
produce; and its FOIA suit to enjoin the agency from withholding the
requested records had been consolidated with the preenforcement re-
view action.
2 46
239. See infra text accompanying note 309.
240. Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 259
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
241. 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974).
242. Other courts have held in FOIA litigation that the Department of Labor may with-
hold the conclusions in a compliance officer's accident report. Eg., Miles v. Department of
Labor, 546 F. Supp. 437, 439-40 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Lloyd & Heminger v. Marshall, 526 F.
Supp. 485, 486-87 (M.D. Fla. 1981). InMoore-McCormack, the court actually read the compli-
ance officer's "Conclusions" and found that they were no more than factually based infer-
ences (iLe., a list of factors which the compliance officer believed caused the accident) devoid
of policy-making or deliberative material. 508 F.2d at 948-49.
243. 508 F.2d at 950.
244. 432 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
245. Id. at 1371 n.23.
246. Thus the Firestone court had jurisdiction to determine the discovering party's access
under the FOIA as well as under the discovery rules. On the other hand, at least two courts
have afforded criminal defendants access in a criminal case to government records not exempt
from release under the FOIA, despite the absence of FOIA requests. United States v. Brown,
562 F.2d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wahlin, 384 F. Supp. 43, 47 (W.D. Wis.
1974). Since the Brown and Wakin courts did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the withholding
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The approach of the Moore-McCormack and Firestone courts is often
followed in complex litigation. In the government's recent antitrust suit
against AT&T, for example, the Special Masters' Guidelines for the
Resolution of Privilege Claims provided that "information obtainable
by a member of the public under the Freedom of Information Act is not
privileged. ' 247 Even in the absence of such a guideline or court ruling,
Antitrust Division lawyers often consult the Division's FOIA staff to de-
termine whether a document sought in discovery is the type of docu-
ment that the FOIA staff would release. This approach recognizes that
it is absurd for the government to waste the court's time by raising a
claim of privilege for a document that the government must release to
the general public under the FOIA.
If Moore-McCormack and Firestone reflected the prevailing approach,
parties to litigation would not resort to the FOIA to discover privileged
documents because the privilege rules would allow the party to obtain
the documents in discovery. By employing different criteria for deter-
mining access rights, the FOIA and discovery mechanisms function in-
dependently of each other; and the FOIA, as the Fifth Circuit held in
United States v. Murdock,24 does not "enlarge the scope of discovery be-
yond that already provided by the Rules. '249 Consequently, the major-
ity view is that a document may be privileged in discovery and
nevertheless available to the general public under the FOIA.2 5 ° In these
instances, the party may use the FOIA to obtain discovery of privileged
documents.
A number of considerations support the prevailing approach of
Murdock. First, it does not burden a discovery court with deciding FOIA
issues.2 5 ' Second, permitting a discovery court to order an agency to
release nonexempt agency records is inconsistent with Congress' grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts over suits by FOIA reques-
of nonexempt agency records, the decisions can only be understood as exercises of the courts'
inherent authority to provide discovery in criminal cases. The Ninth Circuit subsequently
disapproved Brown and restricted the criminal defendant's discovery to that available under
the federal criminal rules. United States v. United States District Court (DeLorean), 717
F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1983).
247. United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 635 (D.D.C. 1979). The special masters were
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Paul Rice.
248. 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
249. Id. at 602. See also Fruehauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253, 1254 (6th Cir. 1974).
Both Murdock and Fruehauf were criminal prosecutions.
250. Eg., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
251. If the nonexempt status of the records was not in dispute, the party already would
have obtained them under the FOIA.
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ters.25 2 Third, the Murdock approach prevents a party from delaying a
proceeding by seeking additional "discovery" under the FOIA. Courts
have resisted efforts to postpone judicial trial dates2 53 or to enjoin ad-
ministrative proceedings254 to allow a party to obtain a FOIA release. If
the same documents were made available to the party in discovery, de-
lay would more likely occur. Finally, the Murdock approach is more con-
sistent with Congressional intent to open up the administrative process
to the inquiring public. While parties to litigation may benefit from the
FOIA access provided to the public, Congress did not intend to afford
litigants additional discovery rights.
2 55
Although it does not expand the scope of discovery, the Murdock
approach permits the indirect use of the FOIA for discovery purposes.
Unable to assert FOIA availability as a defense to a claim of privilege in
discovery, a litigant may still request the documents under the FOIA.25 6
Generally, because the FOIA should provide everyone with a minimum
level of access to government records and discovery should provide liti-
gants with a second level of access to relevant records, a litigant should
not obtain access to privileged materials through the FOIA. But the
ideal relationship between the FOIA and discovery is unachievable as
long as courts develop separate bodies of FOIA and discovery law.
In several recent cases, FOIA courts ordered the release of agency
records recognized as privileged in the discovery context. In Playboy En-
terprises, Inc. v. Department ofJustice ,257 the FOIA court ordered the release
of the Rowe Report. The report reviewed the involvement of a FBI
informant in the 1965 murder of a civil rights worker by Ku Klux Klan
members.2 5 8 Several district courts, in lawsuits brought against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act by the murder victim's
survivors, had held the report to be privileged. 5 9 Similarly, in Weber
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
253. E.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1974) (criminal defendant
unsuccessfully sought mandamus to compel postponement).
254. Eg., Columbia Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir.
1977). Federal courts have the equitable power to enjoin administrative proceedings until a
party obtains the release of nonexempt records under the FOIA, but they should take such a
serious step only upon the strongest showing of irreparable injury. Id. at 500. See also Ency-
clopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975).
255. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 22, 24 (1974).
256. Of course, one disadvantage to this approach is that the litigant has no assurance that
the trial or hearing will await the agency's response to his FOIA request.
257. 677 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
258. A task force established by the Attorney General submitted the 302 page document to
him in July, 1979. Id. at 933.
259. See, e.g., Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. Liuzzo v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 940 (1981) (court did not independently assess the privilege claim
but relied on the determination of the Attorney General).
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Aircraft Corp. v. United States,26° the FOIA court ordered the release of
witness statements obtained in a confidential safety investigation of a
fatal air crash. Courts have traditionally recognized the privileged, offi-
cial information status of these reports.
261
The incongruity apparent in Weber and Playboy results from apply-
ing different standards to release decisions under the FOIA and in dis-
covery. Both Playboy and Weber were exemption b(5) cases raising the
issue of the exempt status of factual material in otherwise deliberative
records. The exemption does not protect purely factual materials "ap-
pearing in . . .documents in a form that is severable without compro-
mising the private remainder of the document. ' 262 To simplify a great
deal, an agency must segregate and release factual portions of otherwise
deliberative records if the release would not expose the deliberative pro-
cess.26 3 The official information privilege, on the other hand, more
broadly protects investigative reports from discovery. 26 4 In the leading
case recognizing a qualified privilege for witness statements,265 the court
held that the factual nature of the statements did not bar a claim of
privilege if the agency, to obtain complete information, had assured the
witnesses of confidentiality (ize., that the agency would use their infor-
mation only for safety and not for litigation purposes).26 6 The Weber
court held that exemption b(5) did not incorporate this civil discovery
privilege for confidential investigative reports. 267 The Playboy court also
expressly rejected, without citation, civil discovery precedents which had
recognized that the selection, interpretation, and integration of facts by
260. 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
261. E.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963).
262. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973).
263. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The records withheld in Playboy and Weber were factual and their disclosure
would not expose the deliberative process other than to reveal what facts the author of the
report or the witnesses thought material. Playboy, 677 F.2d at 935. Therefore, the decisions
were correct under the prevailing interpretation of exemption b(5). Weber, however, is in
conflict with two earlier FOIA cases that afforded witness statements in confidential safety
investigations greater protection under exemption b(5). Cooper v. Department of the Navy,
558 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1977); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th
Cir. 1975). After this Article went to press, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision in Weber. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4351 (March 20,
1984). See infra note 272. (All references to Weber are to the court of appeals decision.)
264. The scope of the discovery privilege is similar to that afforded by FOIA exemption
b(7) for investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.
265. Machin v. Zukert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
266. Id. at 339.
267. Weber, 688 F.2d at 644. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's cautious ap-
proach to the incorporation of discovery privileges into exemption b(5). See, e.g., EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
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high level agency officials-the very process involved in the preparation
of the report in Playboy-are part of the deliberative process and thus
privileged from disclosure.268
In a third decision ordering the release of privileged agency records,
Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health and Human Services ,269 the FOIA
court ordered the release of the nonfederal employment and financial
interests of consultants employed by the National Cancer Institute. The
same court of appeals, in an earlier lawsuit challenging the grant pro-
gram administered with the aid of these consultants, had upheld the
Department's claim of privilege.27  The Washington Post case involved
exemption b(6)-the personal privacy exemption-and the court of ap-
peals reached a different result on the exemption issue than it reached
on the privilege issue because, again, the applicable criteria were differ-
ent. In discovery, the disclosure of the consulants' employment and
financial reports depended upon a balancing of the party's interest in
disclosure against the government's need to foster the gathering of infor-
mation from the consultants. In the FOIA context, the court balanced
the public interest in disclosure against the consultants' privacy inter-
ests. In Association for Women in Science v. Califano ,27 1 the earlier case in
which the court denied discovery, the party's need for the information
did not override the privilege for confidential reports because the party
had access to the information in another form (i~e., the government had
provided the discovering party with direct access to the consultants).
The public, represented by the Washington Post, had no access outside
of the FOIA and therefore had a greater need for the same records.
Because Congress requires the courts to interpret the FOIA as pro-
viding separate access to government records, some litigants inevitably
will be able to discover privileged documents through FOIA requests.
Although the Supreme Court could narrow one of these "gaps" in the
FOIA exemptions by abandoning the factual-deliberative dichotomy in
exemption b(5) cases,2 72 additional gaps will arise in other areas. For
268. Playboy, 677 F.2d at 935. See supra note 259 and the discovery cases cited therein.
Those cases, especially Peck, relied on Judge Weinstein's analysis in In re Franklin Nat'l Bank
Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 587-89 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
269. 690 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
270. Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
271. Id.
272. That interpretation of exemption b(5) is inconsistent with the law of civil discovery
and with the Congress's overall purpose to afford FOIA requesters no more access to govern-
ment records than that which is routinely available to parties to litigation. It has even
prompted a number of lower courts to hold that exemption b(5) does not protect "factual"
statements of witnesses protected from discovery under the work product doctrine when ob-
tained in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d
724, 734-37 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Associated Dry Goods
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example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
cently held that exemption b(4) protects only trade secrets that are used
in the process of production.2 7 The common law, as the court recog-
nized, protects a broader category of trade secrets-any secret that gives
one business a competitive advantage.27 4 The gaps that have so far ap-
peared have not prompted any major use of the FOIA for discovery
purposes but they do encourage some litigants to use the FOIA. Al-
though a circumvention of the discovery rules, this use of the FOIA is
not abusive: it only permits a party to obtain access to "privileged" doc-
uments that are available to everybody else.
F The Use of FOIA to Obtain Irrelevant Records
Because relevancy limitations on discovery do not apply to FOIA
requests, a party may obtain the FOIA release of records that are irrele-
vant to a pending action. Relevance and burden are pragmatic con-
cepts designed to keep lawsuits within reasonable bounds; that
documents are insufficiently relevant to be discoverable does not mean
that they are of no value to the party. When relevancy is borderline and
the burden of complying with a discovery request is considerable, the
trial judge has broad discretion to sustain a relevancy objection. 7 5 He
also may deny burdensome requests that only marginally advance the
objectives of providing information to the parties and of narrowing the
issues in the lawsuit. The civil discovery rules authorize the trial judge to
limit the discovery of relevant documents to matters occurring at a par-
ticular time or at a particular place or pertaining to a particular trans-
action.2 76 A party may easily avoid these parameters on discovery
Corp. v. NLRB, 455 F. Supp. 802, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For a FOIA decision which is
more faithful to the civil discovery approach, see Hoover v. Department of the Interior, 611
F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980) (report of nontestifying expert exempt under the FOIA because not
discoverable routinely but only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances).
The Court's recent opinion in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 52 U.S.L.W.
4351 (March 20, 1984), indicates a greater willingness to recognize discovery privileges as a
basis for withholding records under exemption b(5). In Weber, the Court held that exemption
b(5) incorporates the Machtn privilege for confidential safety investigations. The Court indi-
cated that even factual material could be withheld. Id. at 4353 n. 17. Under this approach,
FOIA and discovery courts normally will apply the same standards to decide whether to
order the government to disclose a record. Although this approach makes it easier for the
government to withhold potentially privileged documents from a FOIA requester, it does not
guarantee that a FOIA court will reach the same result as a discovery court.
273. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
274. Id. at 1286-89.
275. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 132, at § 26.56[11 n.35.
276. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, at 287. Under the 1983 amendments to
Rule 26, the trial judge may act on his own initiative. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)(iii)(trial
court may limit unduly burdensome or expensive discovery).
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through use of the FOIA.
Private parties defending against governmental enforcement pro-
ceedings often desire questionably relevant documents. First, parties
seek to learn of prior inconsistent positions of the agency that may lessen
the weight a court or an agency adjudicator will give to the agency's
present position or that may expose the agency to charges of arbitrari-
ness or selective prosecution. Second, parties are interested in the
agency's internal operating procedures because that information may
help a party to anticipate agency tactics or to challenge any departures
from established procedures.
Courts often limit discovery of prior agency statements and internal
manuals because their production may burden inordinately the agency.
Neverthless, these matters are potentially relevant. Any inconsistency
between the agency's present interpretation of a statute or regulation
and its past interpretation affects the deference that a court gives the
agency's present views.27 7 An agency's inconsistent treatment of simi-
larly situated persons becomes, at some point, arbitrary, or at least re-
quires some explanation. 278  Finally, a violation of an agency's own
regulations or any special, unfavorable treatment afforded a particular
party may provide the party with grounds for relief.2
79
To balance the potential relevance of such documents with the po-
tential burden on the agency, the courts afford discovery on a controlled
rather than on a routine basis. Thus the courts have limited the scope of
discovery when a party is seeking documents that may disclose agency
inconsistency. For example, in judicial and administrative proceedings
brought by the Department of Energy to enforce price control regula-
tions, the courts and the Department's adjudicatory authority (the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals) have permitted some "contemporaneous
construction" discovery. Through contemporaneous construction dis-
covery, energy producers may seek prior statements 28° interpreting or
277. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The weight a court gives an administra-
tive interpretation of a statute or regulation depends on the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, all of those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
278. Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(agency must ex-
plain different treatment afforded similarly situated applicants); IBM v. United States, 343
F.2d 914, 923 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966)(different treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers arbitrary and illegal).
279. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) (agency bound by its own regula-
tions); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (selective prosecution defense to
a criminal charge).
280. The statements may be in the form of official interpretive rulings or actions taken by
low-level inspectors or auditors. McMillan & Peterson, supra note 28, at 372-83.
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applying agency regulations only if the regulation is ambiguous or silent
on the issue in dispute 28 ' or if the agency seeks to apply retroactively a
clarifying interpretive ruling.28 2 The more recent cases have refused to
formulate rules on the scope of contemporaneous construction discovery
but balance "the potential relevance of the desired evidence, along with
the likelihood of its existence, against the burden incurred by the agency
in culling through its files."'2 3 Under this approach, the courts have
limited the discovery of evidence of contemporaneous construction to
particular periods of time or to particular agency filing systems.28 4
The courts also have limited discovery of agency treatment of simi-
larly situated third persons. The Court of Claims, in actions brought by
the United States to redetermine excess profits, has permitted contrac-
tors to discover third party contract data from the Renegotiation Board
but normally has denied discovery of cost data submitted by third party
contractors to procurement agencies. Recognizing that "[o]nce the most
immediately relevant data of the other [contractor's] case is at hand,
inquiry into all its ramifications must be resolutely halted, 28 5 the court
has limited the scope of discovery to prevent the renegotiation of one
contract from becoming an occasion for reviewing those of the contrac-
tor's competitors. 286 The Tax Court has taken a still firmer line against
the discovery of private rulings or other determinations issued by the
IRS to nonparty taxpayers. To establish relevance sufficient to permit
discovery, a party must establish more than an inconsistency between
the Service's prior, nonbinding ruling to another taxpayer and its treat-
ment of the present taxpayer. 28 7  The Tax Court has reasoned that
"even if the private letter rulings can be viewed as potentially relevant,
such relevance is, nevertheless, too remote to cause the underlying docu-
ment to be discoverable."28
281. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
282. United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 633 (D.D.C. 1980).
283. Id. at 634.
284. For the similar treatment of contemporaneous construction discovery before the De-
partment of Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals, see Atlantic Richfield Co., 5 DOE
(CCH) 82,521 (1980).
285. Instrument Sys. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 357, 361 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
286. Boards of Contract Appeals have similarly limited discovery of third party contract
data to those documents for which relevance is clearly demonstrated. Essex Elec. Engineers,
DOT CAB No. 1025, 79-2 BCA (CCH) $14,158 at 69,711 (Nov. 8, 1979) (number of other
contracts for which appellant sought discovery sufficiently limited). See Peacock, supra note
178, at 19-20.
287. See Teichgraeber v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 453, 456-57 (1975). But see Corelli v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 220 (1976) (private rulings to nonparty taxpayer relevant to tax-
payer's liability for negligence penalty). See generally Royal, Discovery Process in the United States
Tax Court, 65 MASS. L. REv. 227, 232-35 (1980).
288. Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 716, 722 (1978). In Davis, the taxpayer was seeking
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Many courts have insisted that the discovering party make a
"strong" or "prima facie" showing of impropriety before permitting any
discovery on procedural irregularities or other agency improprieties.2 89
If a party merely alleges that the agency succumbed to congressional or
other political pressure, received ex parte communications, acted in bad
faith or for an improper purpose, or violated its own regulations, the
courts will deny discovery. 2" Criminal courts also deny discovery on
claims of selective prosecution unless the defendant makes a prima facie
showing that the government has not prosecuted other, similarly situ-
ated offenders and that the government's prosecution of him is selective,
invidious, in bad faith, or based on impermissible considerations such as
race, religion, or the exercise of a constitutional right.2 9'
Relevancy limitations naturally encourage parties to litigation to
use the FOIA. In United States v. Exxon Corp. ,292 an action to enforce the
Department of Energy's petroleum pricing regulations, the defendant
sought to discover internal agency documents construing a regulation
the interpretation of which was in dispute. Limiting the scope of this
discovery, the court established a cut-off date of September 1, 1976, the
date when the Department of Energy issued an interpretive rule that
defined a crucial term in the regulation. The court held that only docu-
ments dated prior to September 1, 1976, were relevant and thereby dis-
coverable.2 9 3 In two parallel FOIA actions, Exxon sought the release of
all agency records construing the regulation, including documents dated
subsequent to September 1, 1976.294 Similarly, in National Presto Indus-
the production of pre-1976 private rulings which were unavailable under 26 U.S.C. § 6110.
See infra note 298.
289. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 663 (D.D.C. 1978).
290. McMillan & Peterson, supra note 28, at 367-73. The authors argue that a lesser show-
ing by the discovering party should suffice if the discovery sought involves neither allegations
of moral turpitude nor inquiries into the thought processes of agency officials. Id. at 372-73.
291. E.g., United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978).
292. 87 F.R.D. 624 (D.D.C. 1980).
293. Id. at 635-36.
294. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 4 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 26,325 (D.D.C.
1981) (thoroughness of Department's search); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, No. 80-
2500 (D.D.C.) (transferred from the Southern District of New York, Sept. 16, 1980). Exxon
obtained the release of a large number of records in response to its FOIA requests and vigor-
ously litigated the thoroughness of the Department's search and the lawfulness of its with-
holding of responsive records, but the judge hearing the enforcement action ruled against
Exxon on the merits before the judge hearing the FOIA actions determined whether the
Department had improperly withheld 245 documents which it refused to release under the
FOIA. United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1983) (decision on merits).
As of late 1983, the district court had still not decided the FOIA cases.
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tries, Inc .,295 a contractor, whose excess profits were subject to redetermi-
nation, sought comparative cost data contained in preaward surveys
and in the submissions of third party contractors from various procure-
ment agencies. The court, in an earlier interlocutory order vacating the
trial judge's broad discovery order, had instructed the trial judge that
third party contract data was discoverable only upon proof of relevance
and notice to the third party.2 96 When the court learned that the con-
tractor had bypassed its discovery ruling by filing FOIA requests di-
rectly with the procurement agencies, the court ordered the suspension
of discovery while the contractor pursued its FOIA requests. The court
instructed the contractor to inform the trial judge when it had com-
pleted its FOIA discovery and to acquaint him with what it had
discovered.29 7
In both Exxon and National Presto the FOIA requests imposed heavy
burdens on the agencies involved and, in effect, deprived them of the
protection from unreasonable demands afforded by the applicable dis-
covery rules. In other areas, however, the use of the FOIA to discover
documents of questionable relevance has become less controversial and
often permits parties to litigation to discover an agency's working law.
Thus, a taxpayer may use the FOIA to obtain private letter rulings is-
sued by the IRS to other taxpayers and the background file documents
with respect to those rulings29 8-information that courts normally con-
sider irrelevant and nondiscoverable. An energy producer also may use
the FOIA to obtain regional counsel memoranda responding to audi-
295. 218 Ct. Cl. 696 (1978).
296. National Presto Indus., Inc., 216 Ct. Cl. 422, 429 (1978).
297. The trial judge then could lift the suspension on discovery to the extent necessary for
the contractor to obtain relevant information not discoverable under the FOIA. Judge Davis,
writing for the Court of Claims, complained that "if the use of FOIA makes it possible despite
our wishes, to make ajarndyce v. Jarndyce out of this case, that is the responsibility of the
Congress which enacted the FOIA, and of the courts Congress has designated to interpret and
enforce the FOIA." 218 Ct. Cl. at 698. For a similar case before the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, see Murdock Contracting and Eng'g Co., ASBCA 204339 (1980). In Mur-
dock, government counsel stopped providing discovery to the contractor when the contractor
filed FOIA requests for irrelevant data on third party contracts. The Board member serving
as trial judge did not rule on the propriety of counsel's action, but he did deny the contrac-
tor's motion to recover the extra expenses caused by the interrupted discovery.
298. Strictly speaking, access to these records is not governed by the FOIA but by 26
U.S.C. § 6110 (1982), which governs the public inspection of the Service's written determina-
tions and background file documents. However, the enactment of that section was prompted
by a court decision holding that private letter rulings were not exempt from disclosure under
the FOIA. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modified and
remanded, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Congress accepted that result, enacting § 6110 to
regulate the release of written determinations by providing certain safeguards, such as the
deletion of identifying details.
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tors' requests for interpretations of Department of Energy regulations. 299
As an agency develops routine procedures for releasing its determina-
tions in other cases and for protecting the interests of the parties to those
cases from unwarranted disclosure of personal or business data, this use
of the FOIA becomes less burdensome. 300
Parties to litigation also have used the FOIA to obtain records that
describe an agency's internal operating procedures or that contain infor-
mation on possible procedural irregularities. These records are also
questionably relevant and not normally discoverable absent some spe-
cial showing. In Lord & Taylor v. Department of Labor,3 0 l for example, a
defendant in a minimum wage and hours enforcement proceeding un-
successfully sought the production in discovery of the Department's
Wages and Hours Diviszon Field Operations Handbook. The defendant em-
ployer subsequently obtained most of the handbook under the FOIA.3 °2
Likewise, in FAA v. Tison ,303 the National Transportation Safety Board,
in a proceeding to revoke a pilot's license for landing on an unopened
runway, had denied, on the grounds of minimal relevance and undue
burden, the pilot's request for a large number of documents on the
FAA's runway closings policy and on the subsequent opening of the run-
way in question. The pilot then obtained the same documents from the
FAA under the FOIA.
G. The Use of the FOIA to Obtain an Additional Search For Relevant
Records
The parallel use of the FOIA and discovery to obtain relevant doc-
uments, or "double-dipping" as it is sometimes called, occurs infre-
quently except in adjudicatary proceedings before a limited number of
agencies. Discovery should provide parties to litigation with access to all
documents necessary to prepare their case. Nevertheless, some parties
use the FOIA for discovery because they believe that a FOIA search will
produce additional documents, or will secure the earlier release of rele-
vant documents.
A FOIA search may produce more relevant documents than a dis-
covery search because public information officers are good searchers and
299. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868-70 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
300. See the elaborate safeguards in 26 U.S.C. § 6110 (1982) for the release of written
determinations by the IRS.
301. Lord & Taylor v. Department of Labor, 39 Ad. L. 2d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
302. Id. The decision of the FOIA court does not discuss the FOIA requester's unsuccess-
ful efforts to obtain the same Handbook through discovery. That information came from
attorneys in the Department of Labor.
303. National Transportation Safety Board No. SE-5551.
[VOL. 43:119
USE OF FOIA FOR DISCOVERY
have access to records that lawyers conducting a discovery search may
not find. Public information officers may release documents that a law-
yer, who represents an agency in litigation and thus looks at the same
document with a more adversarial eye, would consider to be privileged.
Furthermore, even a FOIA response which does not release any relevant
documents may enable the requester to obtain additional documents in
discovery. When responding to a FOIA request, the agency must notify
the requester of its determination to withhold a record. 30 4 The requester
may then formulate a specific discovery request based on the agency
response.
Multiple FOIA requests to the constituent units of an agency also
reach more record custodians, and uncover more responsive records,
than a discovery request directed to the attorneys representing the
agency. At most agencies, the base for conducting FOIA searches is
broader because the agency's system of recordkeeping is highly decen-
tralized.30 5 If the agency expects to process FOIA requests efficiently
and in compliance with the statutory time limits, a FOIA office with
release authority must be located near the records. Far-flung agencies
such as the military departments, the EPA, the Department of Energy,
and the FAA release records at dozens if not hundreds of local, district,
and regional offices around the country. Searching from the bottom up,
public information officers may uncover records that the lawyers,
searching from the top down in response to a discovery request, do not
reach. Lower level program people may have kept long-forgotten stud-
ies, correspondence, or rulings on issues that are now the subject of liti-
gation. Even in an agency as centralized as the Antitrust Division,
lawyers coordinating responses to similar FOIA and discovery requests
acknowledge that public information officers have a better sense of
where to look than do lawyers and therefore may uncover more respon-
sive, disclosable records.
A public information officer may not claim an exemption for a rec-
ord that a litigating attorney would resist disclosing. If the record's cus-
todian does not object, the public information officer normally arranges
for its prompt release without consulting the agency's lawyers. Occa-
sionally, a public information officer may inadvertently release an ex-
empt record that would otherwise be privileged. Government litigation
attorneys have a significant number of horror stories, most unverifiable,
304. This notification must accompany all administrative denials and explain the reasons
therefore. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1982). If the requester sues to enjoin the withholding of
agency records, the court may order the agency to prepare a more elaborate Vaughn index.
305. The Department of Energy, for example, found that the amount of paper shuffling
required to centralize FOIA releases made such a plan unworkable.
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of inadvertent or careless releases.3 °6 In one verified instance, a regional
office of the EPA afforded a FOIA requester access to a roomful of docu-
ments so that he could find the records that he wished the agency to
release. The requester, who happened to be in litigation with the
agency over the subject matter of the records, then argued that the gov-
ernment waived any claim of privilege with respect to the records in the
room.3"7 In another verified instance, the Department of Justice re-
leased a summary of a document while Justice Department attorneys
were arguing in court that the document was privileged. The FOIA
requester was a party to that litigation, and the court held that the De-
partment had waived the privilege when it released the record under the
FOIA.3 °8
A number of agencies have adopted procedures to prevent inadver-
tent releases. These measures normally include involving the agency's
attorneys in FOIA releases. The attorney representing the agency in
litigation will learn of a FOIA request by a party to the litigation if the
public information officer's search leads to the attorney's case file, but if
the party seeks the release of technical documents (e.g., economic or sci-
entific studies) or correspondence discussing the agency's action, the
public information officer's search may end with the program office's
files. The attorney may have only copies of the requested records or
may be unaware of their existence. In these instances, the attorney will
not know of the FOIA request unless the agency has developed proce-
dures for notifying him.
Thus, a growing number of agencies have informally instructed
public information officers not to release records that appear to be re-
lated to pending litigation without contacting the agency's lawyers. At
the NRC, for example, the Office of the Executive Director has insti-
tuted a procedure designed to ensure that the agency's trial attorneys
receive notice of FOIA requests made on behalf of parties to pending
adjudicatory proceedings. Under the procedure, trial attorneys prepare
litigation notices to alert public information officers of pending adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings, and public information officers prepare
summaries of FOIA requests for circulation among the attorneys. 30 9
306. Such stories fuel government attorneys' fears that a public information officer's judg-
ment on when to raise exemption claims may differ from that of a trial attorney. See supra
text accompanying notes 237-39.
307. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. H82-517 (N.D. I11.) (Dec. 2, 1983).
308. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 4 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 9740
(D. Del. 1977).
309. Other agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, the EPA,
and the Federal Reserve Board, also have tried to tighten their FOIA operations by involving
their lawyers in release decisions.
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Nevertheless, it is not easy to detect all litigation oriented FOIA re-
quests. Requests often focus on generic safety issues (e.g., the adequacy
of fire fighting equipment at nuclear plants), and an attorney must iden-
tify requests that pertain to generic issues designated in pending licens-
ing proceedings to determine whether the requests may be litigation
related.
Similar protective measures are not feasible in all government
agencies. In relatively small and centralized agencies like the NRC or
the Federal Reserve Board, an agency may involve its trial attorneys in
responding to litigation oriented FOIA requests and maintain accurate
records of release decisions. In larger agencies, however, such as the mil-
itary departments, the EPA, and the Department of Energy, centraliz-
ing and documenting release decisions in the same manner as denials
would be inconsistent with the openness required by the Act. Timely
release decisions are possible only if the field unit with custody of a rec-
ord has authority to release it. In such cases, the agency's trial attorney,
or the attorney in the Department of Justice representing the agency in
court, simply cannot know with any degree of assurance what records
the agency has released under the FOIA. Therefore, government attor-
neys face not only the danger of surprise but also the embarrassment of
raising a claim of privilege for a document the agency already has re-
leased. A review of the various areas in which these problems may arise,
however, indicates that the FOIA release of agency records seldom
presents a serious problem to government litigators.
1. Parallel Use of the FOJA and Dzscoveiy in Civil Litigation in the Fed-
eral Courts. -Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally pro-
vide adequate discovery of relevant documents, the parallel use of the
FOIA for discovery purposes rarely occurs in civil litigation in the fed-
eral courts. Counsel in the Litigation Division of the Office of the Army
Judge Advocate General produced only one recent case (out of a varied
case load of 1,500 pending cases) in which a party plainly used the
FOIA for discovery purposes. In an enforcement action against a gov-
ernment contractor for failure to pay its employees time and a half for
310
overtime, the contractor's counsel surprised government counsel with
records on weather conditions at the job site where the contractor's em-
ployees worked. The government suffered no prejudice, however, be-
cause the records were not particularly probative on the issue of whether
310. Jim Boothe Contracting & Supply Co. v. United States, No. 82-0038-H-B (S.D. Ala.
Sept. 26, 1983). The dispute arose under the Contract Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40
U.S.C. § 330 (1982). The contractor brought suit for remission of the liquidated damages
withheld by the government.
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the employees had worked the extra hours. 3 1' The other agencies con-
tacted also reported few instances in which parties to litigation made
substantial use of the FOIA to discover relevant documents. When such
requests did occur, they usually could be explained as a result of either a
breakdown in discovery3 12 or the familiarity of the party's counsel with
the agency's filing system-a familiarity which allowed him to make
very specific FOIA requests.3 1 3
The parallel use of the FOIA and discovery occurs primarily in ma-
jor environmental and tort litigation in which relevant documents are
likely to be scattered in hundreds of repositories at dozens of different
agencies. In these instances the purpose of the double-dipping is usually
to verify the completeness of the government's discovery efforts rather
than to substitute the FOIA for available discovery methods. Counsel at
the EPA estimate that only in one percent of the agency's caseload does
a private party make significant use of the FOIA to supplement discov-
ery."' At the Land and Natural Resource Division of the Department
of Justice, there were 500-600 pending cases in the spring of 1983, but
only four parallel FOIA actions. In the hazardous waste enforcement
area, for example, a waste generator who receives notice of potential
responsibility usually responds by making FOIA requests to obtain addi-
tional information, but a generator served with a complaint normally
restricts himself to discovery.
Although relatively rare, double-dipping may impose significant
burdens on the government. In a class action brought against the
United States by persons who suffered adverse reactions to the swine flu
vaccination program,3 5 a number of parties supplemented their discov-
ery of relevant documents with FOIA requests. Because the government
had already produced an estimated 50,000 documents in the national
discovery phase of the litigation, government counsel requested that the
agencies forward the FOIA requests to him so that he could notify the
requester that the agency previously had released the requested records
in discovery. Extensive parallel use of the FOIA also occurred in the
Agent Orange litigation brought by Vietnam veterans against the
United States and the chemical's manufacturers. The Air Force and a
311. The contractor was arguing that bad weather conditions closed the base and pre-
vented the employees from working overtime.
312. See California Canners and Growers v. United States, Cong. Ref. Case No. 2-77 (peti-
tion filed May 18, 1977) (FDA).
313. Mandalay Shores Coop. Hous. Ass'n v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 1195 (Cir. 1982),cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 446 (1983) (Department of Housing and Urban Development case).
314. But see infa notes 370-71 and cases cited therein.
315. For a description of this litigation, see Rheingold & Shoemaker, The Swine Flu Liaga-
tion, 8 Litigation, Fall, 1981, at 28.
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number of other agencies sought to lighten the burden of these requests
by responding that they had already released the requested records in
discovery. 31 6 In these cases, the parties using the FOIA appeared to be
concerned that government counsel had not produced all the relevant
documents during discovery. Finally, prior to the commencement of the
recent litigation challenging the deployment of the MX missile sys-
tem,31 7 the plaintiffs made numerous FOIA requests to the Air Force to
obtain records analyzing the environmental impact of the deployment.
Upon filing suit, the plaintiffs sought the same information through ex-
pedited discovery prior to obtaining preliminary relief. The govern-
ment objected to the burden of responding to both FOIA and discovery
requests at the same time, and plaintiffs' counsel agreed to suspend all
FOIA requests (i.e., to withdraw them temporarily) while the govern-
ment produced the documents in discovery. The trial judge never estab-
lished a time table for discovery and never barred the private parties
from using the FOIA; he simply told the parties to reach an agreement
for expedited discovery.
2. Parallel Use of the FOIA and Dzscovey i'n Cri'minal Cases t'n the Fed-
eral Courts. -The Speedy Trial Act 3 " affords criminal defense counsel so
little time to prepare for trial that he cannot rely on FOIA requests to
obtain relevant documents. Unless the trial court adopts the aberra-
tional approach of ruling on FOIA requests,3 9 defense counsel must use
Rules 16 and 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to discover
the documents he needs prior to trial.
The FOIA is nevertheless occasionally useful to defense counsel for
investigation. Counsel may acquire information on the defendant's or a
witness's background or about the federal facility where the offense al-
legedly occurred. Hospital and medical records and reports on safety
conditions at a facility often contain useful background information.
While defense counsel could seek these documents from the prosecutor
under Rule 16 or from the agency under a Rule 17(c) subpoena, the
materiality and evidentiary criteria in those rules may bar discovery if
316. This tactic is of limited utility because the agency can only invoke it when the party
status of the requester is obvious from the face of the request. Agent Orange is a hot topic at
present; and the Air Force receives, at its Pentagon headquarters alone, several FOIA requests
per day for the release of records pertaining to Agent Orange. Unless the requester is one of
the many counsel of record or a party in the Agent Orange class action, there is no way for
the agency to know whether the requester is a party or is acting on a party's behalf. In fact,
most Agent Orange requests are not litigation oriented but reflect the public's interest and
concern on the matter.
317. Friends of the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (1983).
318. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
319. See supra note 246.
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counsel is only looking for leads on defenses. Thus, in these cases coun-
sel may use the FOIA as an investigatory tool.
3. Parallel use of the FOIA and discovey in agency adjudicati'on. -The
parallel use of the FOIA and discovery occurs most often in agency ad-
judication. Although the absence of provisions for formal discovery does
not necessarily prompt parties to use the FOIA, perceived inadequacies
in administrative discovery increase the parallel use of the FOIA. In
many low-visibility proceedings the parties make little or no use of the
FOIA.32 0 In these proceedings, the issues are relatively straightforward,
and the agency staff usually discloses its files despite the absence of for-
mal discovery rules requiring it to do so. 3 21 Few issues of policy arise,
and the agency only brings charges when the proof of a violation is par-
ticularly strong.32 2 The respondents are usually small businesses whose
counsel may not be as astute in the use of the FOIA as are counsel who
represent larger economic interests before the FTC or the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Because of perceived deficien-
cies in administrative discovery, enforcement proceedings at the Depart-
ment of Energy, the CFTC, and the FTC feature a heavy use of the
FOIA. In those proceedings, most respondents either make FOIA re-
quests during the proceeding or pursue requests that they made during
the agency's investigation.
At the Department of Energy, the Economic Regulatory Adminis-
tration commences an enforcement proceeding by issuing a proposed
remedial order charging the respondent with a violation of the applica-
ble price control regulations. 323 The respondent must file a Notice of
Objection within 15 days and a Statement of Objections (in effect a
320. Examples include unfair trade practice proceedings under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act (Department of Agriculture), enforcement proceedings on the disqualification of
stores from participation in the Food Stamp Program (Department of Agriculture), hazard-
ous materials proceedings before the Materials Transportation Bureau (Department of Trans-
portation), proceedings to resolve disputes over mineral and other public land claims before
the Bureau of Land Appeals (Department of the Interior), and contractor and grantee debar-
ment proceedings under federal housing programs (Department of Housing and Urban
development).
321. At the Department of Agriculture, the presiding officer may order the parties to ex-
change their witness lists and documentary exhibits, but he may not otherwise order them to
produce documents. See 7 C.F.R. § 1.140 (1983). No discovery is available in the other pro-
ceedings listed supra note 320. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 107.315, 107.355 (1982) (Materials Transpor-
tation Bureau); 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.430 to 4.439 (Board of Land Appeals); 24 C.F.R. § 24 (1982)
(Department of Housing and Urban Development debarment proceedings).
322. Excepting only public land appeals, the agencies in these low-visibility proceedings
charge the respondent with the commission of a specific wrongful or dishonest act.
323. The procedural rules for enforcement proceedings are in 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.190-
205.199 (1983).
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combined answer and trial brief) within 40 days thereafter. To obtain
discovery, the party must file a Motion for Discovery with the State-
ment of Objections. The motion "shall set forth the reasons why the
particular discovery is necessary in order to obtain relevant and material
evidence and shall explain why such discovery would not unduly delay
the proceeding. '32 4 Because the interpretation of the applicable regula-
tions is usually in dispute, respondents seek documents containing prior
constructions by auditors, enforcement staff, and other agency officials.
The Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals often affords respon-
dents broad discovery on the prior construction of agency regulations
and has permitted, despite the silence of the Department's procedural
rules on this point, a second round of discovery motions.
32 5
Despite the Office of Hearings and Appeals' broad discovery orders,
respondents are dissatisfied with the discovery they obtain for two rea-
sons. First, they obtain no discovery before filing a Statement of Objec-
tions and Motion for Discovery. In the motion, the respondent must
justify all its discovery requests at the same time. A potential respon-
dent, on the other hand, may make multiple FOIA requests once he
realizes that he is the subject of an investigation.32 6 Second, respondents
do not believe that the presiding officers are sufficiently independent to
ensure that the respondent receives a thorough discovery search. The
presiding officer too often accepts agency counsel's assertion that the
agency has conducted a through search without permitting discovery on
that issue. A dissatisfied FOIA requester, on the other hand, may obtain
a ruling from a federal judge on the thoroughness of the agency's search.
At the CFTC and the FTC, respondents primarily use the FOIA to
supplement their efforts to obtain factual materials in agency files. At
both agencies, respondents routinely discover documentary exhibits;
they also seek to discover factual material (e.g., economic studies, witness
statements) that the agency does not plan to present as part of its case-
in-chief but which might help the respondent. At the CFTC, the presid-
ing officer does not have authority to order the agency or any other
party to produce relevant documents, and the respondent can therefore
obtain these records only by making FOIA requests or by convincing the
presiding officer to order the Division of Enforcement to disclose poten-
324. 10 C.F.R. § 205.198(c) (1983).
325. Atlantic Richfield, 5 DOE (CCH) $ 82,521 (1980) ("crude cluster" proceeding); Gulf
Oil Corp., 8 DOE (CCH) 82,569 (1981).
326. Because a FOIA request by the respondent normally precedes a discovery request for
the same documents, the Department does not produce the documents a second time but
simply informs the respondent what he has already obtained.
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tially exculpatory documents with the agency's case-in-chief.32 7 Re-
spondents have vigorously pursued both routes, but they have had
greater success with the latter than with the former, which the agency
has normally blocked by invoking exemption b(7)(A).3"8
At the FTC the presiding officer does have authority to order the
agency to produce relevant documents, but private practitioners believe
that the Commission's administrative law judges have never become ac-
customed to ordering discovery from agency files. Consequently, the
ALJs allow the agency to withhold as work product factual material
that a district judge would order a party to produce. By seeking the
release of these records under the FOIA, the respondent may obtain a
more objective determination of whether the records are protected work
product.3 29 Once again, this route to additional discovery has not
proved to be particularly fruitful; practitioners report that a respondent
does not obtain many additional, relevant documents under the FOIA.
But respondents continue to make FOIA requests if only to guarantee
disclosure or to obtain the earlier release of documents.
When responding to a respondent's FOIA request, the FTC does
not release exempt records merely because they are available in discov-
ery. Of course, if the agency has produced the documents in discovery
prior to the FOIA request, the public information officer may inform
the respondent that the agency has already released the records to him.
But the respondent cannot use the FOIA to augment the document dis-
covery he has obtained under the Commission's rules or to obtain dis-
covery which, although available under the rules, he has not sought.3 30
This approach is supported by the pragmatic consideration that the
agency's FOIA office, and the FOIA court on judicial review, should not
rule on discovery issues, 33 ' but is subject to the objection that a FOIA
327. The Commission has required the Division to include all exculpatory or Brady mate-
rial in the pretrial submission of its evidence under Rule 12.85. 17 C.F.R. § 12.85 (1983). See
supra note 163.
328. That trend will surely continue because section 222 of the Futures Trading Act of
1982, which appears to qualify as an exemption b(3) statute under the FOIA, allows the
Commission to withhold from public disclosure "any data or information concerning or ob-
tained in connection with a pending investigation of any person." Futures Trading Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 222, 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 2294, 2309.
329. At the FTC, the General Counsel's office hears all appeals from initial denials. 16
C.F.R. § 4.11 (a)(2) (1983). Initial denial authority belongs to the Secretary or, in the case of
open investigatory files, to the bureau or regional office responsible for the investigation. 16
C.F.R. § 4.1l (a) (1) (iv) (B) (1983).
330. Heublein, Inc. v. FTC, 457 F. Supp. 52, 55 (D.D.C. 1978); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC,
1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60.674 (D.D.C. 1976).
331. For a case upholding this approach under the pre-1974 version of exemption b(7), see
Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), afd, 479 F.2d 317 (3rd Cir.), cert.
dented, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973).
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release of discoverable records cannot possibly interfere with an enforce-
ment proceeding.3
3 2
The IRS also has experienced the parallel use of the FOIA by tax-
payers to discover relevant factual documents in investigatory files. Sec-
tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which protects the
confidentiality of tax return information, permits the Service to release
information to a taxpayer only if it determines that "such disclosure
would not seriously impair Federal tax administration. '" 3 33 In criminal
matters taxpayers usually file FOIA requests during the special agent's
investigation; in civil matters they file requests when the case is at the
audit stage in the District Office, on appeal within the Service, or before
the Tax Court. In criminal matters or civil fraud cases, the Service re-
leases very few records-usually no more than correspondence with the
taxpayer, records submitted by the taxpayer, or other "junk" items that
are already known to the taxpayer. In other civil cases, the Service often
releases a great deal, including the much sought after revenue agent's
report (RAR). To determine what records to release, the disclosure of-
ficer contacts the agency official handling the case. These officials-the
revenue agent at the audit stage, the appeals officer at the appellate
stage, and the attorney representing the Service at the Tax Court
stage-all have authority to release information in a taxpayer's file if
they believe that doing so would advance the resolution of the contro-
versy. If the official handling the case would disclose the RAR or other
records, the disclosure officer will release them under the FOIA.
The Service's use of the FOIA to provide discovery to a taxpayer is
necessary because the taxpayer, unlike the respondent in a FTC pro-
ceeding, does not have any right to formal discovery (ile., any access to
discovery rules) during the early, informal stages of the adjudication.
Discovery is available only when the case reaches the Tax Court and the
parties have been unable to stipulate for the exchange of relevant docu-
ments. 3 4 An appeals officer, or a Service attorney in a Tax Court pro-
332. See Campbell v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 259-65
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (release to third party requester of records available to the respondent does
not interfere with enforcement proceedings; exemption b(7)(A) therefore inapplicable).
333. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(2)(1982). This statute qualifies as an exemption b(3) withholding
statute. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 838-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842
(1979). Other courts have gone further, holding that it supplants the FOIA and that a tax-
payer may obtain access to tax return information (zie., to the investigatory file in his case)
only in accordance with § 6103. King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1982); Zale
Corp. v. IRS, 481 F. Supp. 486, 489-90 (D.D.C. 1979).
334. The Tax Court has authority to order the Service to produce relevant documents, but
it requires parties to make reasonable efforts to stipulate for the exchange of necessary docu-
ments before they invoke the court's discovery rules. TAX CT. R. PRAC. P. 70(a); see, e.g.,
Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974).
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ceeding, might well expect some discovery from the taxpayer before he
agreed to disclose an RAR. But because the Service's approach encour-
ages taxpayers to use the FOIA to obtain the release of otherwise discov-
erable information without providing any quid pro quo, the availability
of the FOIA for discovery purposes disadvantages the Service. Under its
approach, the Service also must justify withholding records that nor-
mally would not be discoverable because of their deliberative, predeci-
sional quality.3 3 5
H The Use of the FOZA to Obtain Relevant Agenc Records That Are Not
Adequately Discoverable Because of External Limitations on
Dzscovery
Various limitations on the availability of discovery may prompt a
party to a proceeding to use the FOIA. Discovery is a mutual venture
which takes time, and a party seeking speedy preliminary relief against
the government may prefer to use the FOIA to obtain relevant docu-
ments rather than invoke the cumbersome civil discovery rules.3 36 Simi-
larly, the government, when it is a party to civil litigation, may obtain a
protective order under Rule 26(c)3 37 barring discovery during the pen-
dency of a motion that would dispose of the action. A court will bar
discovery pending the resolution of a dispositive motion if it finds that
subjecting the government to discovery would be unreasonable and un-
duly burdensome. 3
38
335. For example, appellate conference reports may not be exempt under the FOIA even
though they generally are not discoverable.
One should not exaggerate the number of taxpayers who make FOIA requests. In
1982, the IRS received 12,538 FOIA requests, mostly from taxpayers. It denied 3,281 re-
quests for technical reasons (no records, imperfect requests) and relied upon exemption b(3)
and exemption b(7) to withhold records on only 1,510 and 920 occasions respectively. These
figures indicate that only a small percentage of the taxpayers with tax controversies with the
Service make FOIA requests. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AcT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (1982).
336. For an example of this use of the FOIA, see Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auth. v.
Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., No. 82-1210 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
337. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c)(i).
338. For an example of the use of the FOIA to circumvent this limitation on discovery, see
Copper and Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 524 F. Supp. 945
(D.D.C. 1981). In that case an association of copper producers challenged the Treasury De-
partment's switch from a 95% copper penny to a penny that was almost 98% zinc. The
plaintiff sought document discovery on the factual basis for the change. The Department,
after moving to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the plaintiff's lack of standing, ob-
tained a protective order barring further discovery pending the court's ruling on that motion.
The plaintiff promptly resubmitted its Rule 34 discovery request in the form of a FOIA re-
quest to the Department's public information office. In that fashion, the plaintiff obtained
most of the documents it had unsuccessfully sought in discovery, as the Department withheld
only a limited number of records containing deliberative material. This use of the FOIA
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Despite the attractiveness of the FOIA to a party barred from dis-
covery by a protective order, parties rarely use the FOIA in this fash-
ion.339 Parties also rarely use the FOIA to obtain discovery after the
time limits for discovery have expired. The Department of Health and
Human Services reports that in title VII suits against the agency, em-
ployee plaintiffs occasionally use the FOIA to discover relevant docu-
ments when their counsel have neglected to make discovery requests
within the time permitted. There are few other verifiable incidents of
litigants' using the FOIA as a last-minute discovery option.
In judicial review proceedings in the federal courts, a party may use
the FOIA for discovery because formal discovery is either not available
or is quite limited. In statutory review proceedings in the courts of ap-
peals, the applicable rules do not provide for discovery, 34 0 and the re-
viewing court's ill-defined and uncertain power to order discovery has
been "sparingly used." '34 1 In nonstatutory review proceedings in the dis-
trict courts, the civil discovery rules do apply, but review normally is
limited, as it is in the courts of appeals, to the administrative record.3 42
In these "administrative record" cases the government has sought to
avoid any discovery or other fact-finding procedures, and the courts
have permitted discovery only under certain specific exceptions to the
general rule that limits review to the agency record.
34 3
In administrative record cases, the government normally submits
an index of the record to the reviewing court. If the action is in a dis-
trict court, the party seeking review may request the government under
Rule 34 to produce all the documents constituting the administrative
record. What constitutes the administrative record is a matter of some
uncertainty in informal proceedings (both rulemaking and adjudica-
tory) where the agency does not make a decision "on the record" as that
term is used in the Administrative Procedure Act.3 44 The record in-
deprived the Department of some of the benefits of the protective order, although it ulti-
mately won the lawsuit on the standing issue. Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v.
Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The protective order still spared
the Department the burden of responding to interrogatories and depositions, and any coin
collector enamored with the copper penny could have made an identical FOIA request.
339. But for another case where the plaintiff resorted to the FOIA after the government
obtained a protective order barring all discovery, see Cannon v. Marsh, C.A. 82-1479 (D.D.C.
1982) (plaintiff claimed breach of employment contract; government's successful motion to
dismiss based on sovereign immunity defense).
340. FED. R. App. P. 69(b) speaks only of supplementing the record.
341. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1979).
342. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
343. McMillan & Peterson, supra note 28, at 333-34.
344. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c) and 554(a)(1982).
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cludes all documents that the agency considered.4 5 or that influenced
the agency in reaching its decision.34 6 Privileged documents (e.g. , delib-
erative material, legal advice) are either not part of the record, or if
considered part of the record, they need not be disclosed.
If the party challenging the agency action questions the complete-
ness of the record that is certified by the government, the party can
request discovery on that issue. Most district courts afford some docu-
ment discovery on the completeness of the record, but such discovery is
not normally available in a court of appeals. In either case, the FOIA
provides an easier and more effective procedure for obtaining the rele-
vant documents. If a FOIA request results in the release of additional
documents, the party may move to supplement the administrative rec-
ord. In Center for Auto Safety v. Gorsuch ," for example, the petitioners
challenged the EPA's decision to allow General Motors (GM) to offset
excess pollution generated by certain models against pollution savings
on other models rather than to require GM to recall the offending cars.
After obtaining a FOIA release of several factual documents that the
government may have erroneously excluded from the administrative
record, the petitioners requested the court of appeals to supplement the
record.348 Justice Department and agency attorneys do not object to
this use of the FOIA because they receive notice of the records released
under the FOIA before the requester can use them in litigation: there is
no danger of surprise.
A party also may expand the scope of discovery by requesting a
FOIA release of records in the possession or control of an agency that is
not a party to the proceeding. If the proceeding is in federal court, the
party also may seek the documents through the Justice Department at-
torneys representing the government, who may secure the voluntary co-
operation of the agency, or through a third party subpoena served on
the agency itself under Rule 45 or Rule 17(c). If the proceeding is
before an agency, however, the adjudicating agency may not have sub-
poena power or its subpoenas may not be effective in prying documents
loose from the files of other agencies. For example, when an administra-
tive law judge at the FTC issued third party subpoenas to thirteen fed-
eral agencies in the Commission's antitrust proceeding against seven
345. McMillan & Peterson, supra note 28, at 341-42.
346. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
347. No. 82-2032 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 9, 1982).
348. The court of appeals will rule on the petitioners' motion to supplement the record
when it decides the case on the merits. For a case in which a party to a review proceeding was
permitted to supplement the administrative record with documents obtained through the
FOIA, see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 1980).
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major oil companies, the Department of Justice argued that the Com-
mission could obtain documents from executive branch agencies only by
directing its requests to the President. 349 Largely agreeing with the De-
partment, the Commission ruled that it would issue a subpoena to an-
other federal agency only in the most compelling circumstances and
only after a Commission request directed to the President had been de-
nied. 350 Agency attorneys appearing before the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals also report that they cannot extract relevant docu-
ments from nonparty agencies as effectively as do Justice Department
attorneys. Although subpoenas are available to the parties, counsel
often tell a contractor that a FOIA request to the custodian agency is an
easier discovery technique.351
Despite the FOIA's usefulness when administrative discovery is un-
available, the Act is an inadequate substitute for effective discovery, and
private parties are ill-advised to rely exclusively on the FOIA to obtain
government documents. Department of Agriculture records, for exam-
ple, are often relevant to new animal drug proceedings at the FDA, but
the presiding officers do not have authority to issue subpoenas. A party
to an FDA proceeding is nevertheless most likely to secure the timely
production of Agriculture Department documents if he makes a show-
ing of his need on the record before the presiding officer. In these cases,
agency counsel are usually able to obtain the records from the
Department.
As is clear from the discussion in this part, the uses of the FOIA as a
discovery tool are many and varied. The FOIA is useful both as a sup-
plement to and as a substitute for normal discovery techniques. A few
of these uses of the FOIA disadvantage the government in litigation and
are thus arguably abusive. Others impose little or no burden on the
government other than the burdens associated with the usual FOIA re-
quest. Any proposal to correct the abuses must take into account both
the legitimate uses of the FOIA and the peculiar circumstances of the
illegitimate ones.
349. 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1982). Section 8 of the Federal Trade Commission Act instructs other
government agencies to furnish records, papers and information to the Commission when
directed to do so by the President.
350. Exxon Corp., Docket 8934 (Interlocutory Order June 30, 1980). The General Counsel's
office reports that no other respondents have invoked this cumbersome procedure for discov-
ering documents from nonparty agencies.
351. Parties to grant proceedings before the Department of Health and Human Services
also use the FOIA to obtain relevant Department of Labor records, preferring not to rely on
the efforts of agency counsel or the subpoenas of the presiding officer.
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IV. PROPOSALS TO CLOSE THE FOIA TO PARTIES TO PENDING
PROCEEDINGS
A. Description of Proposals
In the fall of 1981, the Reagan Administration submitted to Con-
gress a package of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that
included a provision intended to limit the use of the FOIA for discovery
purposes.3 52 The amendment bars a party to an "ongoing" proceeding,
or any person acting on his behalf, from "making" or "maintaining" a
FOIA request for records "relating to" the subject matter of the pro-
ceeding.35 3 The closing of the FOIA is only temporary; once the pro-
ceeding is no longer "ongoing," a party may seek the release under the
FOIA of records related to the proceeding. In support of the proposal,
the Justice Department claimed that FOIA requests by parties to litiga-
tion divert government resources and impair the ability of the govern-
ment to bring cases to trial.3 54 Although the Department's section-by-
section analysis did not address the issue, the Administration's draft not
only closes the FOIA to persons engaged in litigation with the govern-
ment, but also to persons engaged in private litigation. The latter limi-
tation did not provoke any comment at the hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
but Senator Hatch (the subcommittee chairman) questioned the closing
of the FOIA to a party to an agency adjudication if the agency did not
have adequate discovery rules.35
5
In the fall of 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously
approved, as part of S. 1730, a somewhat narrower provision than that
submitted by the Administration. 356 The Committee's bill did not come
to a vote in the Senate during the 97th Congress but was reintroduced
in the 98th Congress as S. 774. In June 1983, the Judiciary Committee
unanimously approved S. 7 74 .s Section 13 of S. 774 provides that the
352. 1 Hearings, supra note 19, at 638-41 (text and section-by-section analysis of Adminis-
tration's proposed amendments). The Administration's proposals were introduced as S. 1751,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
353. The full text of the provision reads as follows:
A requester shall not make or maintain a request under this paragraph for
records relating to the subject matter of any ongoing judicial or adjudicatory ad-
ministrative proceeding (civil or criminal) to which the requester, or any person on
whose behalf the requester acts in making the request, is a party.
I Hearings, supra note 19, at 641 (section 2(b) of draft bill).
354. Id. at 659-60 (section by section analysis).
355. Id. at 635-36 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose).
356. S. REP. No. 690, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
357. S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983).
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time limits prescribed for an agency response to a FOIA request "shall
be tolled" whenever:
1) the requester, or any person on whose behalf the re-
quest is made, is a party to an ongoing judicial proceeding or
administrative adjudication; and
2) the government is also a party to the proceeding or
adjudication; and
3) the government may be requested to produce the
records in the proceeding or adjudication.
The section then adds that it shall not be construed to bar:
1) a request for any records which are not "related to"
the subject matter of the ongoing proceeding; or
2) a request for any records which have been denied to a
party in the course of a judicial proceeding or administrative
adjudication that is no longer pending.3"'
In support of this provision, the Judiciary Committee asserted that crim-
inal defendants frequently use the FOIA to disrupt the prosecutor's case
preparation and to delay trial. In addition, the Committee objected to
the use of the FOIA to circumvent limitations on civil and criminal
discovery.35 9
Under the Judiciary Committee's bill, the temporary closing of the
FOIA is discretionary with the agency. Unlike the Administration's
proposal, S. 774 permits a party to continue to make and maintain
FOIA requests during litigation. The agency may, if it chooses, decline
to process those requests because the time limits for responding "shall be
tolled." Of course, the agency may respond if it chooses to do so. Once
the litigation terminates, the time limits again begin to run, and a party
may request any records that he did not obtain in discovery.
Another difference between S. 774 and the Administration's bill is
that S. 774 only closes the FOIA to parties in litigation with the govern-
ment who may request the government to produce the records in discov-
ery. This latter modification reflects Senator Hatch's concern to keep
358. The text of the relevant part of section 13 of S. 774 reads as follows:
B. The time limits prescribed in subparagraph (A) of paragraph 6 shall be
tolled whenever the requester (or any person on whose behalf the request is made) is
a party to any ongoing judicial proceeding or administrative adjudication in which
the Government is also a party and may be requested to produce the records sought.
Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to bar (i) a request for any records
which are not related to the subject matter of such proceeding, or (ii) a request for
any records which have been denied to a party in the course of a judicial proceeding
or administrative adjudication that is no longer pending.
359. S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1983).
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the FOIA open to parties to agency adjudication when agency rules do
not afford adequate discovery." 6 It is unclear, however, why the Com-
mittee also decided to require agencies to respond to FOIA requests
made by parties to private litigation. The 1981 Hearings on the Free-
dom of Information Act before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
361
are replete with testimony that private litigants make such requests to
discover competitors' trade secrets and other confidential business infor-
mation. The subcommittee and the full Judiciary Committee re-
sponded by amending the FOIA to provide submitters of confidential
business information with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior
to an agency's release of records designated as confidential by the sub-
mitter.362 But neither body explained why it declined to close the FOIA
to parties to private litigation.
B. Objctizons to Proposals
There are three major objections to closing the FOIA to parties to
litigation. First, the FOIA often provides private parties with speedier,
more convenient access to government records than does discovery. Sec-
ond, parties to litigation normally have a greater need for access to gov-
ernment records than do other persons for whom the FOIA would
remain open. Third, there is no fair or rational way to enforce such a
closing. In addition, temporarily closing the FOIA to parties to litiga-
tion will surely increase the already burdensome prelitigation use of the
FOIA for discovery purposes.
With respect to the first objection, litigants who benefit from the
availability of the FOIA include private litigants who seek government
prepared accident reports, criminal defendants who are investigating
possible defenses, respondents in agency adjudication who do not have
access to formal discovery or who distrust the adequacy of the discovery
available, parties in government litigation who seek records from non-
party agencies, and parties to judicial review proceedings who seek to
verify the completeness of the administrative record. One might even
add to this list parties who seek marginally relevant documents that are
obtainable quite easily under the FOIA but only with difficulty in dis-
covery. The Judiciary Committee's bill responds in part to these con-
cerns by permitting an agency to continue using the FOIA to furnish
parties with discovery if it chooses to do so.
360. See Hearings, supra note 19, at 659-60 (remarks of Senator Hatch).
361. See Hearngs, supra note 19.
362. Both S. 1751 and S. 774 contain elaborate provisions protecting the rights of submit-
ters from inadvertent or mistaken releases under the FOIA of confidential business
information.
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The second objection may be explained by a hypothetical. Let us
assume that the FTC commences a precedent-setting enforcement pro-
ceeding against company X. Other, similarly situated companies be-
come aware of the Commission's action and naturally are interested in
learning as much as they can about the legal and factual bases for the
Commission's new position. As potential parties to future enforcement
proceedings, they may obtain under the FOIA all nonexempt agency
records pertaining to the agency's new policy. Yet, inexplicably, under
the Administration's and the Judiciary Committee's approaches, these
same records are not available to the actual respondent, who of course is
even more interested in their release. Prior to the 1966 amendments to
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act,36 3 a requester had to es-
tablish his interest in the matter in order to obtain agency records. The
FOIA rejected this limitation in favor of "any person" access. To pro-
vide that a party's interest in a record now disqualifies him from ob-
taining access available to others is both retrogressive and unfair.
A possible response to this second objection is that the Administra-
tion's and the Judiciary Committee's approaches affect only the means
by which a party obtains discoverable agency records. Neither proposal
bars all FOIA requests by a party; a party still can obtain records that
are "not related to the subject matter" of the proceeding through the
FOIA. On the other hand, if the records are related to the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding, the party must obtain them through discovery.
This response is not convincing. As discussed above, discovery does
not always afford a party the first level access to agency records avail-
able to the public under the FOIA.364 For example, the government
may block a party's discovery request for relevant documents by success-
fully raising a claim of privilege or by obtaining a protective order bar-
ring discovery prior to the court's ruling on a dispositive motion. Under
the Administration's proposal, the FOIA is unavailable to the party be-
cause of his status as a party, and under S. 774, the agency may close the
FOIA to the party if he can "request" the government to produce the
records in the ongoing proceeding. Apparently it does not matter in
either case that the discovery request has been or will be denied. The
party's "remedy" if a denial occurs is to make a FOIA request after the
litigation terminates, when the party no longer needs the records for
litigation purposes.365 Although it may appear unseemly for a party to
363. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1964).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
365. The discovery provision in of S. 774 § 13 provides that it shall not be construed to bar
a request "for any records which have been denied to a party in the course of a judicial
proceeding or administrative adjudication that is no longer pending." (emphasis added).
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use the FOIA to circumvent restrictions on discovery, it is indefensible
to bar a party, even temporarily, from obtaining agency records avail-
able under the FOIA to other requesters. In addition, this circumven-
tion should not occur very often because in the great majority of cases
discovery affords better access to agency records than does the FOIA.
The argument that discovery provides a party with an adequate
substitute for the FOIA is even less convincing when one takes into ac-
count what records a party must seek through discovery (records that
are "related to the subject matter" of the pending proceeding).36 6 Only
if the phrase "related to" means "relevant" is the closing of the FOIA no
broader than the corresponding access in discovery. But it is not at all
clear that "related to" and "relevant" are synonymous.
The legislative history of the proposed amendments establishes that
their proponents contemplate that the "related to" limitation would do
more than bar parties from obtaining relevant documents through the
FOIA. The phrase "related to" first appeared in the Administration's
1981 draft bill to amend the FOIA.3 6 7 The Justice Department's ac-
companying section-by-section analysis argued that criminal defendants
and civil litigants used the FOIA to "circumvent" the discovery limita-
tion that an agency need honor requests for "relevant" information only
if "compliance with the request would not be unreasonably harassing,
oppressive or burdensome."3 6 The Judiciary Committee's section-by-
section analysis of S. 774 makes the same argument in almost identical
language.36 9 Circumvention of discovery restrictions is thus the evil to
be remedied by the new legislation, and that goal can only be accom-
plished if an agency can deny a party's litigation related FOIA request
when compliance would be "unreasonably" burdensome or would result
in the release of irrelevant records. If the drafters of S. 774 intended to
close the FOIA to parties seeking relevant, discoverable documents, they
366. S. 1751, the Administration's bill, required a party to seek through discovery all
records "relating to the subject matter" of a pending proceeding. See supra note 353. There is
no discernible difference between "relating to" and "related to."
367. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (1982).
368. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 8-9 (October 15, 1981).
369. In civil cases, parties often openly use the FOIA to bypass discovery procedures
or to circumvent discovery requirements that they show a need for the requested
information, the relevance of the information to the case, and that compliance with
the request would not be unreasonably harassing, oppressive or budensome. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Similarly in criminal cases, a defendant seeking discovery must
demonstrate not only the relevance of the information sought, but also that the
request is 'reasonable' and within the scope of criminal discovery. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a).
S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1983).
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could very easily have said so. Thus, it appears that records which are
not "relevant" may still be "related to" a pending proceeding and there-
fore not available to a party under the FOIA or in discovery.
Such a rule would produce inequitable results. For example, in
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA ,370 a citizen's enforcement action brought by
Bethlehem to compel the EPA to promulgate new rules, Bethlehem
sought discovery on the agency's regulation of the steel industry under
the Clean Air Act. As of late 1983, the government had resisted discov-
ery on the grounds that the information sought was irrelevant. The pre-
siding master rejected the government's efforts to limit the scope of
discovery but also refused to order it to produce the documents re-
quested by Bethlehem. The impasse in discovery encouraged Bethle-
hem to make FOIA requests and to file FOIA suits to enjoin the
withholding of these records.3 71 The EPA released many responsive
records while claiming that many others were exempt even under the
FOIA. If S. 774 were law, the EPA could have argued that Bethlehem's
discovery request for the records established that the records were "re-
lated to the subject matter" of the pending litigation and hence need not
be released to Bethlehem under the FOIA. If, on the other hand, FOIA
courts interpret "not related to" to mean "not relevant," then S. 774
would afford EPA no relief and fail to accomplish its essential purpose-
preventing the "circumvention" of discovery restrictions. The use of the
FOIA for discovery purposes is not nearly as burdensome from the
agency's perspective as is a FOIA request for a large mass of irrelevant
documents.
The final objection to the closing of the FOIA to parties to ligita-
tion is that the closing is, at worst, unenforceable and, at best, not en-
forceable in any fair or rational fashion. The legislative history of S. 774
indicates that the language restricting FOIA requests by parties to liti-
gation and persons acting on their behalf "authorizes each agency to
require requesters to identify the persons on whose behalf the requester
is acting in making the request. '"37' Agency regulations therefore could
require a requester to certify whether he is a party to a proceeding or
making the request on behalf of a party to a proceeding, thus deterring
the use of strawmen to make FOIA requests. 3 73 Nevertheless, the ambi-
370. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. 83C 7939 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1983).
371. Rothhaar v. EPA, I.P. 83-123-C (S.D. Ind.) (Nov. 16, 1983)(agency granted summary
judgment); Tabler v. EPA, I.P. 83-168-C (S.D. Ind.) (Sept. 23, 1983)(dismissed without
prejudice on Tabler's motion).
372. 2 Hearings, supra note 19, at 45 (subcommittee's section-by-section analysis of what is
now section 13 of S. 774).
373. Ethical constraints would deter most attorneys from participating in such schemes,
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guity of the phrase "on behalf of" raises serious problems, as does appli-
cation of the FOIA access restriction to persons or organizations who
make FOIA requests for many different purposes.
A FOIA requester clearly is acting "on behalf of" a party if the
party asks him to make the FOIA request. But what if the FOIA re-
quester seeks agency records to inform the public and is willing to make
the records available to any one who asks for them? It should be clear
that, if he makes the request on his own initiative and for his own pur-
poses, he is not acting on behalf of the persons to whom he subsequently
distributes the records. The answer becomes less clear, however, if there
were some prior contact between the FOIA requester and the party to
litigation, or if they share an interest in changing government policy.
These difficulties become clearer when the "on behalf of a party"
standard is applied to an actual case. In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith ,3 for
example, the plaintiffs are Salvadoran refugees seeking political asylum
in this country. As of early summer 1983, the plaintiffs were seeking
discovery from the Department of State of documents pertaining to
political conditions and human rights in El Salvador. At the same time,
the Center for National Security Studies was seeking basically the same
documents under the FOIA. Although the Center made its initial FOIA
request prior to the Salvadorans' lawsuit, the Center maintained its re-
quest, and the Department responded to it, during the pendency of the
Orantes-Hernandez litigation.37 5 There were many entirely proper con-
tacts between the Center's lawyers in Washington and the lawyers for
the Salvadorans in California, and the Center evidently made available
to the Salvadorans' lawyers some of the records it obtained under the
FOIA. On these facts, is the Center acting on behalf of the
Salvadorans? If the Center certifies that it is not seeking the records on
behalf of a party to litigation, may the government challenge the certifi-
cation by asking about prior contacts between the Center and the
Salvadorans and about the Center's plans for sharing the records? A
certification requirement does not mean much if it cannot be chal-
lenged, but challenges will involve courts and agencies in investigating
cooperation between private litigants-a matter that is really none of
the government's business. Even if an agency did not adopt a certifica-
tion requirement, it still would be authorized to toll the time periods for
and any use in the pending proceeding of records obtained through the FOIA most likely
would expose the false certification.
374. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Calif. 1982).
375. Peterzell v. Department of State, C.A. 82-2853 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 3, 1982). As of late
1983, the State Department was preparing a Vaughn index covering the records withheld by it
and already had released many responsive records.
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responding to FOIA requests made on behalf of a party to litigation. If
the requester challenged a tolling determination, then the agency would
need to conduct some sort of proceeding to find the facts before apply-
ing the ambiguous "on behalf of a party" standard.
The difficulty in applying a certification requirement to requests by
the parties themselves is not one of ambiguity but of overbreadth. In-
dustrial giants like GM, and public interest organizations like the
Center for Auto Safety, are almost always involved in litigation with the
government. If GM or the Center for Auto Safety makes a FOIA re-
quest for records pertaining to auto safety, it is almost inevitable that
those reocrds will be "related" in some fashion to a pending proceeding
to which the requester is a party, perhaps a low-visibility administrative
proceeding before the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
The employee who makes the FOIA request on behalf of the organiza-
tion may be completely unaware of or uninterested in the pending liti-
gation. The phenomenon of the left hand not knowing what the right
hand is doing applies to many large organizations.
It might be argued that a law permitting the temporary closing of
the FOIA to parties to pending proceedings would not be overbroad if it
were construed in light of its purpose-to bar the use of the FOIA as a
supplementary discovery device. On this reasoning, the FOIA would
remain open to a requester who is seeking agency records to plan com-
pany activities or to support a lobbying effort. Perhaps that result is
consistent with the purpose of the bill, but the language of S. 774 re-
quires a contrary result. Unless the requested records are unrelated to
the subject matter of pending prodeedings, the agency may decline to
process a party's FOIA request during the pendency of that proceeding.
If, therefore, the records are "related to" the proceeding, the requester's
purpose in seeking their release is irrelevant. Evidently, the drafters of
S. 774 contemplate that the left hand may always find out what the
right hand is doing.
Thus, if agencies implement S. 774 through a certification require-
ment, employees must ask their employers' lawyers about pending litiga-
tion before making a FOIA request on behalf of the employer. If the
records an employee seeks are "related to" a pending proceeding, he
must certify as to the employer's party status, and the agency then may
delay processing the request by invoking the new tolling provision.
Thus, not only would a temporary closing of the FOIA be overbroad,
but it would almost force private entities to centralize their procedures
for making FOIA requests. Some large organizations (chiefly busi-
nesses) already have done so by requiring a high official to approve all
FOIA requests made on behalf of the organization. But some businesses
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and most public interest groups allow employees more discretion in
making FOIA requests, and they should not be forced to adopt a more
centralized, cumbersome procedure.
C An Alternative Prosposal
The chief disadvantage of prior proposals to deal with the abuse of
the FOIA for discovery purposes is that they deprive litigants of the
timely first level access available to everyone under the FOIA. Congress
should consider requiring a party in litigation with the government to
notify government counsel of all discovery motivated FOIA requests.
By amending the FOIA in this fashion, Congress can protect the govern-
ment from the abuses of the FOIA which do occur without depriving
litigants of equal rights under the Act.
A notice requirement limited to discovery motivated FOIA requests
would not impose a significant burden on a party in litigation with the
government. To comply with the notice requirement, a party's counsel
need only mail a photocopy of each request to government counsel; the
filing of a certification with the agency's FOIA office would be unneces-
sary. If an employee of a party seeks the release of agency records for
nonlitigation purposes (e.g., planning or lobbying purposes), then the
employee need not notify government counsel of the request. More im-
portantly, the employee need not even determine whether the requested
records are related to pending litigation between the employer and the
government.
Although fairness dictates that government counsel should receive
notice if an opposing party is using the FOIA for discovery purposes,
existing procedures do not ensure that he will receive notice. Govern-
ment counsel might obtain information about a party's FOIA requests
through discovery, but that disclosure may come too late to be of much
value. Furthermore, the requester may seek to block disclosure by
claiming work-product protection. Although advance notice of FOIA
requests may make it easier for government counsel to become involved
in the FOIA release decision and thus deprive a party of a nonadver-
sarial (and perhaps more generous) response to the request, parties still
should receive the minimum level access to which they are entitled
under the Act.
The suggested notice requirement should also lighten the govern-
ment's disclosure burden by permitting government counsel to eliminate
duplicative searches and releases. An agency need not release records
under the FOIA that the agency already has produced, or is producing,
in discovery. The FOIA only proscribes the improper "withholding" of
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agency records, 376 and the definition of "withholding"-significantly
impairing a requester's ability to obtain records or significantly increas-
ing the amount of time a requester must wait 3 77-affords agencies con-
siderable leeway in responding to FOIA requests. An agency has not
improperly withheld a record if the agency has made the record avail-
able to the requester in discovery. 378 On the other hand, if the FOIA
request precedes any discovery request, then the agency must respond to
the FOIA request in the normal fashion but it need not produce dis-
closable documents a second time in discovery.
Because a discovery search is normally more intensive than a FOIA
search,3 79 government counsel's authority to avoid duplicative searches
is not as clear as the authority to avoid duplicative releases. If an
agency has conducted a discovery search prior to a FOIA request, the
FOIA does not require an additional search for the same records unless
there is reason to believe that the discovery search did not produce all
responsive agency records or that the agency has acquired additional
responsive records subsequent to the discovery search. (A FOIA search
must only be calculated reasonably to uncover all relevant documents;
although additional responsive documents conceivably may exist, an
agency need only conduct a reasonable search. 3 0 ) The agency's public
information officer may limit any subsequent FOIA search to files not
searched during discovery, but the information officer's superior knowl-
edge of the agency's record keeping systems-knowledge which often
leads him to uncover records missed during a discovery search-still
benefits the FOIA requester. On the other hand, if the FOIA request
precedes a discovery request, the agency should conduct both a normal
FOIA search and a discovery search. The agency can nevertheless re-
duce the burden of the discovery search by maintaining accurate
records on the scope of the FOIA search and on the records released.
Another means to avoid the disruption of the government's trial
preparation when it must respond to discovery motivated FOIA re-
quests would be to allow the government to respond to these requests
376. See Kissenger v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 139 (1980).
377. See, e.g., McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
378. See Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which the court held that the
agency's disclosure of records to the FOIA requester in discovery mooted the FOIA re-
quester's lawsuit. Id. at 1340.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
380. See Weisberg v. Department ofJustice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Perry v.
Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Although in both Weisberg and Pery
the reasonable prior search was a FOIA search, the same principle should apply to a reason-
able prior discovery search.
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
before the court or agency in which the proceeding is pending.38 1 Nev-
ertheless, there are serious drawbacks to this untested approach. Litiga-
tion is already an overly complicated affair. To inject FOIA issues into
all judicial or administrative proceedings in which the government is a
party would complicate the proceedings still more, exacerbating the
well-documented problem of delay in our courts.3 8 2 The disruption
caused by discovery motivated FOIA requests is not serious enough to
warrant further disruption of the litigation process. In addition, as-
signing FOIA issues to the discovery court could dilute a party's rights
under the FOIA. The discovery court will naturally focus on the docu-
ments that it believes the party needs for trial or hearing; discovery stan-
dards will inevitably take precedence over FOIA standards. Parties to
litigation therefore may receive less favorable treatment than other
FOIA requesters. Although consigning a party to discovery for vindica-
tion of his FOIA rights is better from the party's perspective than closing
the FOIA to him altogether, the adverse effect upon the justice system
mitigates against this option.
381. The trial court or agency could apply FOIA standards to resolve FOIA issues.
382. Accordingly, the Department of Justice always tries to prevent discovery courts from
considering FOIA issues.
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